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ABSTRACT

Computational Modeling for Transportation Network Security. (December 2011)
Sherif Ahmed Tolba, B.Sc., Mansoura University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Reda Anwar Ammar

The transportation system is among the different systems that require high levels of
security. Threats that endanger security can be any external factors which may cause the
system to malfunction or even fail. This work addresses two important elements having a
significant effect on the security of the transportation network. The first is the dynamic
interaction between an attacker targeting the network and the entity which protects it. The
second is the technology used to protect the network and the assurance of its suitability
and proper functionality.
Modeling the interaction between the attacker and the defender is important for
understanding the evolution of each side and being able to make informed decisions
about the ways of defense and technology deployment. There have been several attempts
to model this interaction, but including the perceptions of both participants in the model
is very rare. One contribution of the proposed model is the inclusion of these perceptions
and exploiting them to support technology deployment decisions. The system dynamics
modeling approach is used to build the interaction model. The model takes a set of
intelligence-based input variables and produces a temporal road-map for technology
deployment plans taking into consideration link (road) ranks and many other important
parameters such as external real-world factors.
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Results show that technology deployment does not necessarily need to be
implemented all at once; instead, it can be spread over an appropriate time period. They
also show that the protection agency’s uncertainties have big impact on the outcomes of
this interaction. Finally, it was also concluded that a suitable representation of what
represents a chance for the attacker is very important for producing accurate model
outputs and making correct decisions.
In addition to having a well studied temporal road-map for technology deployment, it
is necessary to select a suitable deployment and assure the proper functionality of the
deployed technology. This is what the second part of the work is concerned with. There
are several technologies that can help securing the transportation network. Attention is
given to Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) as they offer countless security applications.
Two deployment algorithms, which can be applied to transportation networks of different
scales, were developed along with a software tool that facilitates the use of these
algorithms by protection agencies.
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NOMENCLATURE

ANPR

Automatic Number Plate Recognition

ARA

Adversarial Risk Analysis

BS

Base Station

CAS

Collision Avoidance System

CBRNE

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive

CC

Command Center

CCTV

Closed Circuit Television

CG

Computational Geometry

DRT

Deployment Realization Tool

GIS

Geographic Information Systems

GN

Gateway Node

GPS

Global Positioning System

HS

Homeland Security

ITS

Intelligent Transportation Systems

MAT

Medial Axis Transform

MS

Mobile Sink

P2I3

Perception squared Interaction cubed model

PGIS

Parking Guidance and Information System

QoS

Quality of Service

RFID

Radio Frequency Identification

RSU

Road Side Unit
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SN

Sensor Node

TMC

Traffic Management Center

V(D)MS

Variable (Dynamic) Message Signs

V2V

Vehicle to Vehicle (Communication)

VII

Vehicle-Infrastructure Integration

VIP

Video Image Processors

VLSI

Very Large Scale Integration

VS

Vice Sink

WSN

Wireless Sensor Network
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction
Transportation network security is of utmost importance. Similar to the other vital
infrastructures such as power plants, water and sewer systems, oil plants, and military
bases, the transportation network has a significant impact on the flow of daily life tasks.
Economy is directly affected by the state of transportation networks. Public welfare and
prosperity are other elements that get affected greatly by the state of the transportation
network. Due to the recent and continuing attacks and disasters that strike different
transportation network elements, it has become very important to provide suitable and
efficient means to secure the transportation network. This, of course, includes all modes
of transportation and all supportive structures and services. Homeland security agencies
and governments have become interested more and more in utilizing well established and
emerging technologies and techniques to achieve the desired level of safety. Large sums
of public and private money have been invested in developing and inventing new
methodologies to achieve and maintain these security levels. The targeted technologies
have a wide range, starting form very simple screening processes to advanced
technological systems intended to acquire and analyze data and make sophisticated
decisions.
In this work, the main focus is on developing techniques supported by software tools
to aid technological planning and decision support for homeland security agencies. The
work is divided into two basic parts; one is associated with provision of a technology
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deployment road-map, and the other is associated with the development of a WSN
deployment algorithm to aid the technology deployment process.
First, a model and an accompanying tool are developed to facilitate the planning
process of technology deployment in transportation networks. The developed model takes
a set of intelligence data and produces a road-map for sensor deployment in terms of the
time frame for conducting the deployment and the number and the selection of the links
that will be protected.
Second, close attention is given to the deployment process, taking into consideration
the needs of the routing protocol which will be used in the deployed network. Two
deployment algorithms were developed. Also, a software tool aiming at serving HS
personnel in making use of these algorithms to obtain deployment information (such as
sensor densities and distribution) was developed.
Discussion of the results obtained using the developed model and algorithms are
provided. A discussion of the usefulness and practicability of the results is also included.
1.2. Problem Summary
This section provides a quick overview of the addressed problems and their
breakdown. The attacker-defender interaction model is first discussed. Then a summary
of the deployment problem is given.
1.2.1. Attacker-Defender Interaction Model
It is doubtless that the mental power of human beings is superior to all man-made
technologies. This has been the reason for continuously having different successful attack
scenarios against transportation networks at different places in the world. Whenever a

3
homeland security agency uses a specific technology or approach, the opponent tries to
find vulnerabilities in that technology and utilizes them for his advantage. The natural
consequence is that the HS agency then tries to develop new ways and technologies that
make it more difficult for the attacker to succeed. Then the scenario repeats again and
again. Hence, it is noticed that there is an interaction between the two opponents where
there are turns of success and failure.
Considering the perceptions of both sides of the interaction is important for HS
agencies in order to enable the prediction of future events and try to stop them or mitigate
their effect if they happen. The interaction is modeled in this work to study the evolution
of both parties over time and to provide a road-map (time plan) for sensor deployment
along with the number and the selection of transportation network links to be protected at
each point in time.
1.2.2. WSN Deployment and Packet Routing
The model that was briefly discussed in the previous sub-section had the target of
providing the plan for deployment and the time frame for doing so. After having this
information, the HS agency is supposed to select and deploy an appropriate technology to
achieve the desired protection goal. Wireless sensor technology is has recently been one
of the candidates due to its diverse military, civilian, and environmental applications. We
select WSNs technology for use in this work and specifically for the purpose of detecting
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Enhanced Explosive (CBRNE) devices.
Currently available wireless sensors used for this purpose are expensive and bulky.
Research is being conducted to reduce the prices and sizes of such sensors while
maximizing the detection capabilities. Our goal is to provide a deployment plan to allow
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protecting network links while achieving the highest performance for the deployed
network. We believe that achieving high performance in terms of energy consumption,
end-to-end delay, throughput, network lifetime, reliability, etc. cannot be achieved
effectively if WSN deployment and packet routing protocol design are separated.
Therefore, we consider many routing-related parameters such has hole avoidance and
energy depletion while designing the deployment algorithm. On the other hand, routing
protocols should be designed in such a way that allows the best use of the deployment
features. The contribution of this part is the proposal of two deployment algorithms that
take into consideration link (road) importance from the transportation perspective and
protocol performance metrics from the WSN perspective.
1.3. Security: Basic Definitions
Before delving into the details of the interaction between attackers and HS agencies
and the deployment of protective technology to secure transportation networks, it is
important to understand the meanings of different security-related terms. This will make
the following discussions easier.
1.3.1. Hazards and Threats
Hazards and threats are very closely related. They can be simply thought of as a cause
and a result. Hazard is the cause and threat is the result. Green (2008) and SRA1 defined
hazard as “a condition or a physical situation that has the potential to cause harm”. For
example, a hurricane or an earth quake represent a hazard. A possible attack to some
critical infrasture is also considered as a hazard. Willis et al. (2005) defined a threat as
“the probability that a specific target is attacked in a specific way during a specified time
1

The Society for Risk Analysis : http://www.sra.org/resources_glossary_g-i.php
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period”. This simply means the probability that an attack occurs. Of course this is in the
context of human caused hazards and the resulting threats. A similar definition is also
applicable for natural or technology caused (such as a nuclear plant failure) hazards. A
threat was defined by Green as “the expected impact of a developing hazard, and the
probability that this impact will work against our vulnerabilities”. From the above
definitions, we can provide the following definitions for hazards and threats:
Hazard: An expected or probable dangerous event whether natural or man-caused.
Threat: The probability of occurrence of a hazardous event and the negative impact
that it causes.
We also note that hazards lead to threats or pose threates of different levels.
1.3.2. Impact / Consequences / Damage:
These three terms are usually used interchangeably to express the result of a hazard
event that has been realized. The term ‘damage’ is straight forward. Impacts and
consequences are used to express damage because the impact or the consequence of an
event that is involved in risk analysis usually, if not always, causes some kind of damage
to the system. However, a distinction should be made between the latter two terms as
pointed out by Green: impacts are considered “a result of the event” while consequences
represent the “result of the interaction of the impact with other systems”. In addition, he
distinguished them in terms of their time span; impacts are short term while
consequences are long term. The following definitions for the above three terms can be
concluded:
Damage: Physical (or sometimes incorporeal) undesired results of a realized hazard
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Impact: Short term, event-induced damage1
Consequences: Long-term results of the impact’s influence on other systems1
1.3.3. Vulnerability
There are several definitions for vulnerability that have been found. For example,
Willis et al. defined vulnerability as the conditional probability of an attack causing
damage given “a specific attack type, at a specific time, on a given target”. Another
definition given by Wetsen (2005) is: “the degree of loss caused to an element or a set of
elements due to the occurrence of a hazard of a certain magnitude”
The above definitions and all other existing ones agree on the fact that vulnerability
deals with the exposure of a system to the hazards and/or attacks. In other words, as
stated by Green, vulnerability reflects “how well or bad a system is protected” or is
secure in the face of threatening hazards. Below, we provide our definition of
vulnerability.
Vulnerability: A measure of the degree of damage that could be encountered (due to
the system’s exposure and susecptability to being damaged) if a hazard is realized
1.3.4. Risk
The definition of risk may differ slightly from one context to another (Wetsen). The
classic risk model defines risk as the product of the probability of event (e.g. attack)
occurrence and the damage of that event (Amenaza (2003), Rausand (2005), and Green).
Another very common definition of risk that is, in fact, a further breakdown of the
previous one was provided by Ezell et al. (2010), Willis et al., and Amenaza. That

1

Used the same distinction that Green (2008) provided
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definition expresses risk as the product of three terms; the probability that an attack or a
hazardous event occurs “threat”, the probability the attack succeeds, i.e. causes damage,
given that it occurs “Vulnerability”, and the consequences of the event “consequence”.
This indicates that the probability of occurrence of the attack event is in fact the product
of threat and vulnerability as pointed out by Amenaza. In addition to the mathematical
product of these factors, Willis et al. provided the following definition for risk which we
adopt as well:
Risk: “The expected consequence of an existent threat for a given target, attack
mode, and damage type”
We adopt similar mathematical definitions for risk, threat, consequences, and the
attack-event probability to the ones provided by Willis et al., Amenaza, and Ezell et al. as
follows:

i.e.

Risk = Event Probability  Consequence

(1)

Event Probability = Threat  Vulnerability

(2)

Risk = Threat  Vulnerability  Consequence

(3)

1.3.5. Risk Analysis
As was noticed from the above definition of risk, it is concerned with threats,
vulnerabilities, and consequences. Risk analysis as a result is the process of identifying
hazards, their associated threats, system vulnerabilities to the threats, the consequences of
their realization, analyzing these threats and vulnerabilities, estimating the risk, and
trying to reduce or eliminate the consequences using appropriate countermeasures. There
are several standards for risk, risk management, and risk assessment/analysis that are
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based on the context in which it is dealt with. For example, ISO 177991 is an information
security standard that includes many sections; one of them is associated with “risk
assessment and treatment”. According to that standard, risk analysis is intended to
“identify threats and vulnerabilities and analyze them to determine the exposure of a
system and try to reduce or eliminate impacts”. Another standard is NORSOK2; for risk
and emergency preparedness analysis, which describes risk analysis as the process of
“using available information to identify hazards and estimate risk”.
In general, risk analysis can be classified into two categories in terms of the analysis
approach: qualitative and quantitative risk analysis. Qualitative risk analysis is simply
based on rating. The risk is rated on a scale of high, medium, and low. This approach is
common due to its simplicity as it does not require knowledge of the probability of event
occurrence. This approach provides as output the risk level. Quantitative risk analysis, on
the other hand, requires knowledge of the event probability and the consequences. The
quantification of this probability is usually the problem (Amenaza, 2003) and is case
specific. It is also difficult to accurately expect and quantify the consequences. At the end
of this approach a value for the risk based on the product of event probability and the
consequences is provided.
1.4. Security in Transportation Networks
The diversity of transportation modes and the complexity of the associated
infrastructure make their protection a manifold process. Taking the road network as an
example, there are several aspects related to securing them, such as securing highways,
1

ISO 17799: http://17799.denialinfo.com/risk.htm
NORSOK STANDARD Z-013, “Risk and emergency preparedness analysis”, Norwegian Technology
Centre, Rev. 2, 2001
2
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city streets, bridges, tunnels, bus systems, traffic control centers, city entrances and
exists, traffic control software systems, etc. Another example is the railroad systems
where security achievement requires the protection of the stations, vehicles, tracks, and
other related operational software systems. The process of securing the above and other
transportation modes includes the deployment of protective technologies for the
infrastructure and the use of efficient strategies and practices. Traditional means of
security in transportation include video surveillance via Closed Circuit Televisions
(CCTVs), passenger and baggage screening at access points, and intelligence
information. The power of these techniques has decreased over time as new threats began
to arise due to technological advances. This required the development and exploitation of
more advanced technologies to cope with such threats. The development of intelligent
transportation systems (ITS) with the aim of achieving comfort and safety to passengers
as well as maintaining the smoothness of traffic, maximizing time savings and economic
progress, and enhancing the quality of life, is another booster of the technological
advances that support transportation security. With the advance of this field, several
technologies that were already there, and new ones that emerged as a result of the dire
needs of that field, became of significant importance to serve both intelligent
transportation objectives and security requirements. In the next section, we give an
introduction about intelligent transportation systems and discuss some of these
technologies.
1.5. Intelligent Transportation Systems and Security Improvement
Intelligent Transportation Systems abbreviated as ITS, represent transportation
systems that exploit information and communication technologies. The use of these
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systems has numerous objectives, including: 1) passenger convenience; in terms of travel
time, congestion reduction, and accident avoidance, 2) traffic management; by
controlling traffic flow, collecting traffic data and extracting traffic patterns and other
important traffic information, and giving travel guidance information to passengers, 3)
emergency response; through real-time detection of accidents, retrieval of accident
information, notification of other passengers, and the notification of emergency crews
about the accident’s location and severity, 4) low enforcement; by detecting speed and
other regulation violations, 5) security guarantee; through the detection of suspicious
behaviors, carriage of explosive devices, and other technological or natural hazards, 6)
economic benefits; by smoothing the flow of businesses and reducing fuel consumption.
Numerous technologies and applications for addressing the above needs exist and
some have been already implemented in different countries like The United States,
United Kingdom, Japan, Singapore, and others. Other technologies are being developed
with the aim of using them to improve transportation network security. Examples of
existing technologies include: 1) Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) application; used in several contexts such as parking, access control, road tolling, border
control, trip time measurement, and low enforcement1, 2) vehicle detection and
surveillance technologies, Mimbela et al. (2007) - technology; classified as intrusive and
non intrusive sensor technologies. Intrusive sensors require some sort of embedment into
the roadway or its sub-layers. They can be fixed on top of the road surface, inside the
pavement, or in the subgrade of the road. Non-intrusive sensors need not be embedded in
the road. They can be placed either on the road or alongside the road. Examples of
intrusive sensors include inductive loops, weigh-in-motion sensors, magnetometers,
1

http://www.anpr.net/anpr_09/anpr_applicationareas.html
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piezoelectric cables, and microloops. Non-intrusive sensors include, video image
processors (VIP), microwave radar sensors, ultrasonic, passive-infrared, laser radar
sensors, and passive acoustic sensors, 3) Closed Circuit TVs (CCTVs) - technology;
closed circuit means that the captured video is sent to a specific place, usually a control
room located at the Traffic Management Center (TMC), as opposed to being broadcast
and being publicly available. It is used to provide a means of monitoring roadways for the
purpose of incident quick response, incident severity determination, and travel advisory
services, FDOT (2011), 4) Variable (Dynamic) Message Signs (VMS or DMS) application; electronic message boards used to inform travelers of congestions, road
blockages due road work, accidents, or other incidents (FDOT), 5) Global Positioning
System (GPS) – technology/application; there is no doubt that GPS is a ubiquitous
technology and is one of the technologies that inherent to the intelligent transportation
system. As is well known, GPS’s guide passengers to their destinations, provide arrival
time information, and enable passengers to select either shortest path or shortest time
routes. They also have the ability to detour passengers upon request when there is a
traffic jam, 6) Dynamic Traffic Light Sequence - application, Al-Khateeb (2008);
traditionally uses inductive loops, video image processing, or beam crossing to detect
vehicles and then schedules the traffic light time sequence in real-time. Recently, with the
development of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), many suggestions to use this
efficient technology in vehicle detection and light sequencing were made. The brief idea
is that RFID readers are mounted at the intersections, while RFID tags are attached to
different vehicles. The readers detect different vehicles’ arrival times and locations then
start sequencing the traffic light in real-time to allow smooth traffic flow, 7) Variable
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Speed Limits1 - application; usually used to reduce traffic speed in bad traffic or weather
conditions. In the past, they were controlled manually from the traffic management center
based on the observed road or weather conditions, and recently they have been
automated. Many countries already have them in place such as the United States,
Germany, Britain, New Zealand, and Austria. They are usually placed on the road
segments with extremely varying road conditions, dangerous road topology like steep
roads or roads with hidden bents, or where many accidents frequently happen.
The above are only few examples of some ITS technologies and applications. There
are many others such as Collision Avoidance Systems (CAS), emergency vehicle
notification systems, automatic traffic enforcement, smart traffic evacuation management
systems, Vehicle-Infrastructure-Integration (VII), Vehicle-to-Vehicle communication
(V2V), etc.
1.6. Modeling Approaches Used in Transportation Security
In the previous section, we listed some of the existing and emerging ITS technologies
and applications. As stated previously, two of the goals of these technologies and
applications are security guarantee and assistance of emergency response. Another very
important assistive approach in this regard is modeling and simulation. Through
modeling and simulation, informed decisions can be made which should, together with
these technologies, lead to the sought results. Several approaches for modeling the
interactions between attackers and HS agencies, analyzing the risks of attacking the
system, and quantifying these risks exist in the literature (See section 3.1 for more
details). In this section, we give a brief introduction about some of these approaches.
1
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1.6.1. Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Models
It is important recall the difference between to types of mathematical models before
starting the modeling process, namely descriptive and prescriptive models. This should
make the model design process structured, clear, and avoids confusing the objectives of
different parts of the big model. Descriptive models, as their name implies, describe and
simulate the behavior of a system or a device. On the contrary, prescriptive models try to
find the best result for some problem. This result can then be used to prescribe a course of
action to be followed (S. Chapra and R. Canale, 2006).
In this work, we use a mixture of descriptive and prescriptive models as will be seen
in Chapters 2 and 4. The model we propose consists of three sub-models. Two of them
are descriptive (RW and Attacker Perception models) while the third (HS Perception
model) is a prescriptive model. Furthermore, the big model that consists of these three
sub-models can be classified as prescriptive, because the main goal is to provide HS
personnel with a decision support system.
1.6.2. Game Theoretic Approaches
An approach used to study and analyze strategy interactions between two or more
intelligent players. Each has a set of strategies to select from and achieves a certain
payoff by choosing a specific strategy. Some of the common categories of games are:
cooperative and non-cooperative, symmetric and asymmetric, zero-sum and non-zero
sum, simultaneous and sequential, and perfect and imperfect information games. Noncooperative games describe the details of all the available moves/strategies of the players,
while cooperative ones abstract the game and deal with its big picture. Cooperatives
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games usually allow the formation of ‘coalitions’ of players. In symmetric games,
identities of the players can be changed without changing the payoff of the strategies1.
Constant-sum games are games where the payoffs of the players add to the same constant
sum. A special case of constant-sum games are the zero-sum games, where the gain
achieved by one player corresponds to a loss by the other, and therefore, the total sum of
the payoffs is zero (Cummings et al., 2006). In simultaneous games, the players move
simultaneously, while in sequential ones, they move in alternating steps. Games also
assume ‘perfect/complete’ or ‘imperfect/incomplete’ information, which describes
whether each of the players knows the choices/actions of other players or not.
Strategies of the players can be either ‘pure’ or ‘mixed’ strategies. A pure strategy is
the one that describes how a player responds to each game situation, while a mixed
strategy is a probability distribution on the set of pure strategies; i.e. it picks a specific
response with a specific probability. There are four main representations of a game,
namely: the extensive form, the normal form, the characteristic function form, and the
partition function form.
An important definition in Game Theory is the Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibrium is
obtained when none of the players can achieve a better payoff by changing strategies.
Game theory has applications in economics, political science, psychology, biology,
computer science, and recently, in risk analysis. The literature contains many examples
where Game Theory is used to model the interaction between defenders and attackers for
the purpose of assessing system vulnerabilities and quantifying risk. Some of these
examples will be discussed in chapter 3.

1

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory
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1.6.3. Bayesian Decision Analysis Approach
An approach used for risk assessment in different fields such as medical and computer
systems, intelligence analysis, and transportation security. It uses Bayes’ theorem to find
probability distributions of the system’s random variables of interest based on the
distributions of other random variables in the system. A network called Bayesian
Network, represented as a directed acyclic graph, is used, where the nodes represent the
random variables and the arcs represent the dependence of one variable on others. An
associated algorithm is used to solve the network using Bayes’ theorem and to find the
probability distribution of the variable of interest in terms of the conditional and
unconditional probabilities of the other random variables. The results are then used to
update the network. As mentioned above, this approach is suitable for analyzing
intelligence information and in making decisions. This is due to its ability to model
complex interactions between variables, and dynamically update the probabilities
(Cummings et al.).
Game Theory and Bayesian Decision Analysis are only two of the several modeling
techniques that are used for risk analysis. For a more detailed discussion of the above and
other techniques, we refer the reader to Ref. Cummings et al. (2006). In the next subsection, we discuss system dynamics, the approach we used in this work.
1.6.4. System Dynamics Approach
System dynamics is an approach used to model complex systems and the interactions
between their constituent variables. It was originally created to help corporate managers
better understand their industrial processes (Radzicki and Taylor, 1997). Now, it is
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widely used in different fields such as project management (Sterman, 1992), health
applications (Homer and Hirsch, 2006), and marketing (Richardson and Otto, 2008). The
two main components of system dynamics are causal loops and stock and flow diagrams.
Causal loops are feedback loops that connect causes and effects in the system. Stock and
flow diagrams are composed of two components: First, stocks, which are also called level
variables, are variables that accumulate over time. This can be envisioned as the water
level in a tank. Stocks do not disappear if time is hypothetically stopped (Kirkwood,
2010). Second, flows (rates), are exactly as their name indicates. They are rates of change
of level variables. An example would be the control of the water valve used to fill the
tank. Flows disappear if time is hypothetically stopped. An example system illustrating
different system dynamics’ concepts is shown in Fig. 1.

Figure1: An example system showing different system dynamics’ concepts
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1.7. Wireless Sensor Networks
This section is organized as follows: first, we give a brief introduction about
wireless sensor networks, then, the use of WSNs in transportation networks in discussed.
Finally, we discuss both the deployment issue as well as data routing in such networks.
1.7.1. Introduction
Advances in the Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) technology, wireless
communications, Information Technologies (IT), sensing technology, and in the
computational capabilities, has led to the development of Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs). Attention of several the researchers has shifted towards the design and
development of all technological aspects related to WSNs in the last two decades. The
reason for this significant interest is the uncountable number of applications that they can
be used in. Applications vary from military to civilian, industrial, and environmental
applications. Examples of these applications include, but are not limited to: habitat
monitoring, utility meter reading, border protection, structure conditions’ monitoring,
bomb detection, battle field monitoring, target tracking, health data collection, and many
others. Another two very important applications for our purposes are: traffic data
collection in ITSs, and transportation network security, through their use as a means of
surveillance.
WSNs consist of small wireless devices called ‘nodes’ or ‘motes’ that have sensing,
computational, and communication capabilities. They can sense temperature, humidity,
acoustic signals, magnetic fields, light, direction of movement, speed, etc. However, they
are limited in energy as they receive their power from a small battery. This feature is
inherent to the design of sensor nodes; they are designed to be cheap and to have
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Figure 2: Some popular WSN nodes: CrossBow’s (a) MICA2 (b) IMote2 (c) TelosB (d)
MICA2DOT (e) MICAz (f) IRIS

unattended operation. Usually, WSNs are deployed in large amounts unless is otherwise
necessitated by the application. Some examples of popular nodes are shown in Fig. 2.
Because each node has limited energy, communication, and computational resources,
a proper design of the network in terms of the deployment and the routing protocol is
necessary. For this reason, a huge amount of literature exists in this field, trying to
address different problems, in spite of the recent emergence of WSNs.
1.7.2. Use of WSNs in Transportation Networks
As in many other applications, WSNs find several uses in transportation networks.
From a surveillance perspective, WSNs can be used in vehicle detection, classification,
and reidentification (Cheung et al., 2007). Vehicle detection is done by means of either
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the acoustic or the magnetic signatures which can be acquired by the sensors. The
classification and reidentification of vehicles can also be done through magnetic
signature analysis. Classification can also be done by the use of a vision-based sensor
system.
WSNs can also be used for law enforcement through the use of visual sensors for
automatic number plate recognition. Other applications of WSNs in ITSs, which assist in
traffic management and passenger convenience, include traffic signal control (traffic light
sequencing described previously), on-ramp metering, Parking Guidance and Information
Systems (PGIS’s), work zone management, road condition sensing, vehicle infrastructure
integration, and vehicle-to-vehicle communication. Of course there are several other
applications of WSNs in this field, but we give these applications as examples only.
1.7.3. Sensor Deployment
An important consideration when attempting to implement WSNs for use in any of the
above applications is sensor deployment. In WSNs, a deployment can be deterministic,
random, or a combination. The nature of the application and the requested performance
are the main controllers of the shape of the deployment. For example, in a traffic light
sequencing application, the deployment usually is deterministic as only a small set of
sensors is needed to accomplish the task. Another reason for this determinism is that the
scale is very small, i.e. limited to the intersection. On the contrary, a large scale
deployment intended for use in accomplishing a surveillance task on a city scale would
almost always be random. When the size of the WSN becomes very large, deterministic
deployment becomes nearly impossible. Also, wireless sensor network design expects the
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deployment to be random as the sensors may be deployed in some areas where human
access would be dangerous, and also, because unattended operation is implied.
Several works have been proposed, as will be seen in Chapter 3, which suggest
different deployment schemes some of which are deterministic and other nondeterministic. The design of an efficient deployment protocol requires considering
several parameters such as the expected traffic pattern, geographical topology,
application requirements, and system cost. We believe that such a design must be done in
parallel with, and in close relation to, the routing protocol design. A good deployment
should be assistive to the routing protocol, and a good routing protocol makes the highest
benefit from the deployment and preserves it from loss due to node death as a result of
fast energy depletion.
1.7.4. Routing in Wireless Sensor Networks
The main purpose of a WSN is to provide a specific service. In WSNs, all services
occur by means of phenomenon sensing and data transfer. Therefore, it is necessary to
assure the availability of an efficient routing protocol. In this field specifically, a huge
amount of literature exists; each of the existing protocols tries to address a set of
important parameters. For example, energy consumption, end-to-end delay, packet
success rate, reliability, throughput, bandwidth, network lifetime, and service
differentiation, are all very important parameters. Many classifications of routing
protocols based on the network structure, protocol operation, quality of service, and data
centricity have been proposed. Routing protocols are mainly concerned with routing the
data packets from sources to the destinations while saving the limited node resources and
maximizing the network’s lifetime. Again, we believe that as separation between the
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designs of deployment algorithms and routing protocols will lead to suboptimal
performance. Therefore, we emphasize the importance of having a concurrent design for
routing and deployment, and consider many routing related factors in the design of our
deployment algorithm.
1.8. Issues and Challenges in Transportation Network Security
Although the necessary technology needed for ITS and transportation network
security applications is available and even new technologies are being developed, there
are still some problems that hinder or slow the implementation of these technologies. ITS
America (2002) determined these challenges to be: 1) the trade off between security and
privacy, as the integration of information systems usually tends to compromise privacy,
2) the negative effect on mobility, efficiency, and cost

that may result from the

implementation of these technologies if careful analysis, planning, and execution were
not given the appropriate attention, 3) the desire for even better technologies and software
tools to esnsure the prevention and detection of threats, 4) increase in technical
complexity that is associated with the integration of these technologies with the already
complex transportation system, and security issues that emanate from increasing the
system size, 5) the resulting need to have additional layers of security to address the
security of the surveillance technology itself, 6) funding, needed for developing,
implementing, and maintaining these technologies, 7) institutional coordination
challenges, and finally, 8) the missing community involvement through problem
reporting and clarity of security needs.
One of the challenges that we find closely related to ability of implementing our
proposed WSN deployment algorithm in reality is the privacy challenge. Although WSNs

22
were designed initially to have large numbers of sensors that are spread over a large
geographical area to achieve some certain task, and that is what our algorithm does, there
is a concern that given that large number of sensors, and the proposed deployment, it
would be necessary to distribute these sensors in urban areas where there are thousands of
personal properties. Community involvement by allowing the implementation of these
devices within or near there properties raises a question about the feasibility of the whole
process. Therefore, as indicated by ITS America, it is necessary to address these
problems wisely to be able to make use of technologies that is expected to increase public
safety.
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CHAPTER II
PROBLEM STATEMENT

2.1. Modeling and Simulation Framework
This chapter describes the general modeling framework that unifies the problems
under consideration and discusses each sub-problem in details. We start with the
discussion of the framework and then go through each sub-problem individually. This
will give a big picture of the targeted output and put the discussion of the problems in the
appropriate contexts.
It was pointed out in the introduction that this work is concerned mainly with two
parts; attacker-defender interaction and sensor deployment. These two elements are part

Figure3: Different elements of the used modeling and simulation framework
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of a general framework that aims to assist an HS agency in making correct and informed
decisions, in addition to assisting it in deploying a suitable technology for protection
purposes. The framework consists of four elements as shown in Fig. 3. The two
remaining elements are a vulnerability assessment model and a routing protocol.
The vulnerability assessment model (Wang et al. 2011) was proposed and
implemented in Java previously by the research team. Although the details of that model
are not within the scope of this work, we give a short description of its purpose and how
it works. The objective of the model is clear from its name; it assesses the vulnerability of
the considered system. The model takes, as input, a transportation network (road
network) in the form of a text file containing trip origins and destinations, link free flow
travel times, link capacities, origin-destination demand, and other variables. It uses Game
Theory, where there are two players involved: an attacker (tester) and a defender (router),
to assess the network’s vulnerability in terms of the failure probability of each link. This
is done through a game where the router tries to route traffic through the network and the
tester tries to disable links. The routing probability for each link and the failure
probabilities are calculated in every iteration of the game. User equilibrium is also
considered in the traffic assignment model used. A convergence criterion is used to force
convergence. At the end there is a set of link failure probabilities which can be easily
mapped to link ranks. The output of this model is an input to the attacker-defender
interaction model as shown in Fig. 3. Next, we formulate the problems for the two middle
elements of the framework, and finally, end with the routing element.
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2.2. Discussion of the First Sub-problem: Attacker-Defender Interaction
Referring to the middle section of Fig 3, it can be seen that after getting the desired
information about the ranks of different roads in the considered network, the technology
deployment planning process starts ahead. At this stage, it is necessary to know the
available budget, the range of available and suitable technologies to select from, the time
frame for deployment, and the suitable strategy for that deployment. The budget section
of this process is again not within the scope of this work. In addition, we select WSNs as
the protection technology to be used supported by the reasons discussed in the
introduction. The remaining two sections are the deployment time frame and the strategy,
which we will elaborate on.
Deployment timeframe is a very important element in the protection process. If the
budget is constrained and an unwise deployment timeline is followed, this may lead to
the drain of available resources quickly and lead to catastrophic consequences. Therefore,
the objective of the first element, attacker-defender interaction model, is to study the
interaction between the two entities over a timeframe in order to conclude a suitable
deployment time plan.
Another issue addressed by the model is the estimation of the overall system
vulnerability and the risk imposed on the system. Recall that the first element of the
framework is the vulnerability assessment model. However, that element produces the
link failure probabilities as the measure of vulnerability. On the other hand, the attackerdefender model produces the probability of attack success as a result of the interaction of
all system elements. Therefore, the second model can be considered as the general
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version that uses the individual link vulnerabilities to assess the overall vulnerability of
the system.
Given the above discussion, the statement of the first considered problem can be
formulated as follows:
Statement of Problem 1: “Given a set of transportation network links along with
their respective ranks, which are based on the attack/failure probabilities of each link,
produce a technology deployment roadmap indicating the timeframe and extension of
deploying the technology and the increments (amount) of the deployment at each step.
This roadmap should be based on the interaction between the HS agency and the
attacker, considering the perceptions of both sides and the real world factors that affect
that interaction. Also, provide an estimation of the actual probability of a successful
attack on the network and the probabilities from the perspectives of each participating
entity”
The solution of the above stated problem is accomplished by dividing it into three
parts as will be seen in Chapter 4, and then integrating these parts in one big model. The
modeling approach used is system dynamics, which was discussed earlier in the
introduction.
2.3. Discussion of the Second Sub-problem: Sensor Deployment in Transportation
Networks
The next step after preparing a deployment roadmap is to find a suitable deployment
strategy. The purpose of this step is to find a deployment that guarantees the best
performance of the system, facilitates the retrieval of the necessary information in a
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timely manner, and extends the network’s lifetime. As noted previously, this step is very
closely related to the routing protocol step. A clear separation between the two can not be
made without degrading the performance of the applied technology. Therefore, a
consideration of each of these two elements while designing the other is unavoidable.
Two deployment algorithms were proposed in this work. Although the main target of
such deployments is to properly protect the network, the difference arises from the
capabilities of each deployment approach. One of the two approaches addresses routingprotocol related issues such as the high traffic near the base stations and the ‘hole’
problem only, while the other takes into consideration link ranks as well. The problem
statement is provided below. It should be noted that the first proposed approach does not
satisfy all the requirements, while the second does. This one of the reasons the second
approach was proposed.
Statement of Problem 2:

“Given a shapefile (GIS data file) containing network links

and a set of respective link ranks, propose a deployment for the BSs, CCs, and the
sensors that: 1) minimizes the effect of high near-base-station traffic on the depletion of
node energy and the formation of holes around the BSs, 2) extends the network lifetime,
3) makes the data flow smoother throughout the network, 4) takes link ranks into
consideration (highly ranked links will have higher data traffic around them; therefore,
they should be given a special consideration similar to how the BSs and CCs are treated).
The deployment must cover all network links. The nodes need to be deployed randomly
and node densities at different locations in the network are to be output”
At the end of this stage, a ready to implement deployment should be available.
However, a good design for the deployment strategy is not sufficient. The performance of

28
the resulting WSN is governed by the deployment as well as the routing protocol that will
be used. A deficiency in one of them will hurt the overall performance. Hence, great
attention should also be paid to the design of the routing protocol.
2.4. The Data Routing Problem
Referring back to Fig. 3, the forth and last element of the proposed framework is
‘data routing’. The design of an efficient data routing protocol for the considered WSN is
of immense importance. Even in the presence of a good deployment, if the routing
protocol is badly designed, the influence on the performance is very severe. This may be
in the form of long delivery delays, short network lifetime, low reliability, etc.
WSN routing protocols differ in design from one application to another. Application
requirements such as node/sink mobility, high data rates, longer awake times, etc. pose
restrictions on the design of a specific routing protocol. The common goals of all
protocols are to provide high reliability, energy savings i.e. longer network lifetimes, low
end-to-end delay, high delivery ratio, and other service and resource requirements, with
differing levels.
Although the road was paved in this work to build an efficient routing protocol
through the design of a routing-aware deployment, the design and performance testing of
the protocol are considered as future work. Some work has been done in the design
process, but it is not complete yet. Here, we present a statement for the routing problem
to give the reader an idea about the features of the targeted protocol.
“Given the routing-aware deployment presented in this work, design a routing
protocol that best utilizes the near-(BS, CC, and high-rank links) sensor redundancy to

29

Figure 4: Tools suite
achieve: 1) minimum end-to-end delay, 2) longer network lifetime, 3) smoother data
traffic flow through the network, and 4) ‘hole’-introduction avoidance. The protocol must
also have low control packet overhead and simple computational complexity”
2.5. Built Tools and their Integration
The development of the different elements of the proposed framework is accompanied by
building a suite of homeland security assistive tools for decision support, sensor
deployment, and data routing performance evaluation. Two of these tools, namely: the
decision support and the sensor deployment tools, have already been implemented (only
the sensor deployment tool has a GUI currently). The decision support tool consists of the
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first two elements of the framework, i.e. the vulnerability assessment model and the
attacker-defender interaction model (also called perception model). The third tool;
routing protocol performance evaluation tool, is still under development. The usage flow,
inputs, and outputs of these tools are shown in Fig. 4.
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CHAPTER III
PREVIOUS WORK

3.1. Attacker-Defender Interaction
The first part of this work is concerned with analyzing the risk of having a successful
transportation network attack, and modeling the behavior of an attacker in response to the
efforts of intelligence agencies to counter his trials to attack the system by means of
technology deployment. Risk analysis is a wide field that is being used in different
disciplines such as management science, health care, and security. Several quantitative
and qualitative models to analyze and assess risk have been made. These models have
been suggested in different contexts. The common target of all them is to analyze risk.
We limit our attention to terrorism risk analysis in this work.
Qualitative risk analysis has been in use for a long time. Researchers and risk
analyzers prefer using this type of analysis because it does not require knowledge of the
probabilities of different events and is easier to perform. It depends mainly on the rating
of different parameters and on expert opinions. There are several works that use this
approach, which is really helpful in many contexts. For example, Hudson (1999),
Crenshaw (2000), Borum (2004), Victoroff (2005), and Ackerman et al. (2007), all
focused on surveying existing psychological and sociological theories, classifications of
terrorist mind-sets, behaviors, motivations, and on analyzing available data about these
terrorists. In a similar context, Jackson et al. (2007) studied the interaction between
defensive technologies and counter measures and their co-evolution on four terrorist
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groups. They, then, drew a group of lessons for technology planning and the design of
defensive technologies.
The other approach, quantitative risk analysis, was followed by many other
researchers. Although it has some difficulties associated with it, like acquiring the
probabilities of different attacks, it is sometimes worth doing since it provides us with
quantitative measures that can be used to take more accurate decisions. Howard (2005),
for example, proposed a quantitative measure to assess the usefulness of the used security
measures in deterrence methodologies for the commercial ferry attack scenario. The
measure represented a “cognitive state in the mind of the terrorist” which accounted for
the perceived observable quality of the protection measure, its perceived accuracy, and its
perceived reliability. Jenelius et al. (2010) used the Game Theory approach to find the
optimal resource allocation based on system element ranks. They formulated the attacker
and defender problems as optimization problems, and considered many factors such as
the observation errors on the attacker side, uncertainties on the HS side, many system
elements, different attacker types, and the non-attack alternative. A system for decision
support, threat response planning, and risk assessment was proposed by Tsang et al.
(2010). They used Agent-based simulation, swarm intelligence, social science findings,
and real humans to conduct the experiments in a virtual environment. They also
considered crowd behaviors, terrorist attacks, and rescue missions. As a trial to evaluate
defender’s investments, Parnell et al. (2009) used the defend-attack-defend decision
analysis model. They also provided a comparison between uncertain hazard risk analyses
with intelligent adversary risk analysis. In a slightly different context; computer system
security, Almasizadeh and Azgomi (2008) used Markov Chains (MC) to model the attack
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process on a computer system. Intrusion process was considered as atomic sequential
steps, and the system tried to transfer its state to a secure state after each atomic step. We
believe this technique can be generalized to other attack scenarios. Paté-Cornell and
Guikema (2002) presented a probabilistic model that addresses the objectives of the U.S.
and the attacker, the different possible scenarios, and the dynamic interaction between the
two opponents. They used risk and decision analyses as well as some game theoretic
elements to build their model. Their target was to provide a reasoning approach to help
prioritizing the threats and the selection of appropriate countermeasures. The study of
benefits of the countermeasures in the reduction of threats was also a main goal. Another
piece of work, by Bell et al. (2008), used the game theoretic approach to posit attack or
failure scenarios on the road network, and to minimize the maximum expected loss if the
event occurs. Insua et al. (2009) and Rios (2010) suggested a framework for Adversarial
Risk Analysis (ARA) that extends traditional risk analysis techniques and included
statistical risk analysis, Game theory, and Bayesian analysis. They, in addition, surveyed
counter-terrorism models such as: the sequential defend-attack model, simultaneous
defend-attack model, defend-attack-defend model, and sequential defend-attack model
with defender’s private info.
Finally, we conclude with a classification of risk assessment techniques as proposed
by Cummings et al. (2006). They classified the existing risk analysis techniques into
standard and emerging ones. Some of these techniques are shown in Fig. 5. Furthermore,
we show the components of Insua et al.’s proposed framework on the figure. As we use
system dynamics for risk analysis in this work, it is necessary to show where it belongs in
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Figure 5: Risk Assessment Techniques

that classification. Ezell et al. classified system dynamics as belonging to probabilistic
risk assessment.
3.2. Wireless Sensor Network Deployment in Transportation Networks
Transportation network security has gained special attention in the recent years due
the repeated and, in several cases, successful attack trials. Several techniques are used to
achieve this security, some of them are technology-based and others are strategy,
planning, and design based. Dornan and Maier (2005) listed four categories for security
incident countermeasures in surface transportation; prevention, protection, redundancy,
and recovery. As stated in their report, prevention includes the means used to disallow
access to some sensitive assets of the transportation system by the use of either
technology, such as intrusion detection systems, CCTV’s, and access control systems, or
by non-technology based methods like fences, doors, locks etc. Protection is used when
prevention is insufficient and includes target hardening by suggesting new designs or

35
retrofitting old ones. The third category, redundancy, is meant to be on the modes’ level,
by having redundant transportation modes and redundancy in each mode, and on the
technology level used to improve the security, such as redundant data exchange methods,
to avoid failure in the case of an incident. Recovery is concerned with disaster response
systems such as emergency notification systems and first response as well as rerouting of
services and reconstruction. Wireless sensor networks can be used in any of these
categories. Applications of WSNs include intrusion detection (prevention), structure
condition monitoring (protection and target hardening), monitoring of large scale areas
for different events (technological redundancy), and incident location monitoring and
assessment of the incident’s severity (recovery).
Y. Chen et al. (2009) proposed a transportation network specific WSN deployment
and an associated routing protocol. The primary focus was on the routing protocol
development. For the deployment part, they used a system architecture consisting of three
elements; a Mobile Sink (MS), Sensor Nodes (SN), and Vice Sinks (VS). The mobile
sink is carried by a vehicle moving along the road. Sensors nodes were assumed to be
densely deployed in the sensing field and are responsible for routing the sensed data from
one VS to the other. VSs were assumed to be fixed on light posts, have unconstrained
energy, and are the only nodes capable of communicating the data with the MS. The
architecture is shown in Fig. 6. Although the authors addressed energy efficiency in the
design of the routing protocol, we believe that the architecture used does not address the
fast death issue in the nodes lying in the vicinity of the road from a deployment
perspective. These nodes will be more susceptible to energy depletion due to the higher
packet traffic near the road; as any traffic moving towards the sensor field or leaving it
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Figure 6: The deployment used by Y. Chen et al. (SN: sensor node, VS: vice sink,
MS: mobile sink)

towards the VSs will be through them. Also, the installation of fixed nodes along the
roads is not scalable for a large number of roads with many of them having a high
priority. Finally, this architecture relies on the MS and is not suitable for the surveillance
scenario that we consider; where continuous monitoring and timely detection is required.
Yuan and Zhu (2006) proposed a wireless sensor transportation monitoring network
(WSTMN) that consists of a mixture of both wired and wireless network components.
The wireless part was a sensor network that had five types of nodes: monitoring center
node, gateway nodes (BSs), sink nodes, sensor nodes and target nodes, according to their
naming criteria. In their suggested scheme, sensor nodes were assumed to be placed in
the road surface. They also found the minimum number of sensors needed to provide the
monitoring capabilities while minimizing the system cost. Fig. 7 shows an illustration of
their proposed system. Again, for a large scale deployment that covers the road network
of a whole city, it is very difficult to have such manual and deterministic deployment.
Also, placing such sensors in the road surface would be very expensive on the large scale.
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Figure 7: The deployment proposed by Yuan and Zhu

An interesting and important research done by Cheung and Varaiya (2007) as part of
the California PATH program studied and experimented the use of WSNs in
transportation network surveillance. They conducted several experiments and analyses in
the context of vehicle detection, classification, and reidentification. However, all these
experiments were conducted using a very small number of sensors and the deployment
was always deterministic. It is worth to mention, however, that they pointed out the
benefits of having a large scale deployment of WSN due to its capabilities and
configuration flexibility. Also, the possibility of integrating WSNs in multi-function
wireless ITS systems, that not only do surveillance but also can sense road conditions and
assist vehicle-infrastructure integration (VII) techniques, was pointed out.
Wenjie et al. (2005) proposed an architecture based on WSNs for guidance and
control in ITSs. The objective of their work was to minimize the average travel time of
the vehicles in the network. They considered a traffic system consisting of three main
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components; intersections, roads, and vehicles. The system had three types of WSN
nodes corresponding to the above elements, i.e. an intersection unit, roadside unit and
vehicle unit. Roadside and intersection units were assumed to be fixed on light posts,
while vehicle units are carried by each vehicle. Again, the deployment was deterministic.
Although this kind of deployment may serve the objective if their work, we do not
believe it is suitable for the attack detection and prevention context for the reasons
mentioned previously. Fig. 8 shows their suggested architecture.

Figure 8: The network architecture proposed by Wenjie et al.

Mirko et al. (2009) introduced a traffic monitoring system based on WSNs. The
architecture of the system included three basic elements. The first is a Road Side Unit
(RSU) that is responsible for retrieving data from a Gateway Node (GN), which is the
second element, and performing advanced data processing. The connection between the
GN and RSU is wired, and the RSU can be connected to more than one GN. The third
element is a set of n Sensor Nodes (SNs) that collect traffic and road condition data and
forward it to the GN. The proposed deployment is linear along the roadside with regular
spacing between sensor nodes. Even the RSU, as the name indicates, is on the side of the
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Figure 9: The network architecture proposed by Mirko et al.

road. The system is intended for collecting traffic data that can be used for generating
safety warnings. Fig. 9 shows the architecture of the proposed system.
We conclude with a very interesting piece of work by Toumpis and Tassiulas (2006).
They proposed an approach for optimal deployment of large WSNs. The approach
depended mainly on the big similarity between the features of WSNs and electrostatic
fields. The sources were represented by positive charges while the sinks were represented
as negative charges. Instead of dealing with the deployment problem on the microscopic
scale - i.e. trying to find locations of individual sensors - they followed a macroscopic
approach by considering deployment densities at different locations. An assumption that
the network considered for deployment is highly dense, and that the sources and the sinks
of information are spatially distributed were used in their proposal. After approximating
the sources and the sinks by an information density function, they formulated the
deployment problem as a constrained optimization problem. The solution of that problem
produced the optimal spatial density of sensor nodes, their total number, and the induced
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(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 10: Electric field lines and constant potential loci created by two opposite charges.
(a) q = 1 Cb. (b) q = 2Cb. (c) q = 4Cb. (Courtesy of Toumpis and Tassiulas, 2006)

traffic. Eventually, the nodes (according to the found number) are placed with a node
density function as close as possible to the optimal density function. In one of two cases
discussed, where a bandwidth-limited capacity achieving physical layer was used, the
final step of placing sensors can be done by placing a sensor at the intersection of each
electric field line with the constant potential loci. An example of these field lines,
constant potential loci, and their intersections that are used for sensor placement is shown
in Fig. 10. The above work is very closely related to the deployment algorithms proposed
here. Our work follows a very similar approach in terms of the use of electrostatics and
the sensor density based deployment.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY

4.1. Introduction to the Solution Approach
The first part of the work uses a mixture of prescriptive and descriptive models to
tackle the problem of the evolving interaction between HS agencies and attackers. We
believe this should always be the case with such models, as their objective is to help HS
agencies make informed decisions. Therefore, it is necessary to account for the behaviors
and actions of the attacker and then be able to draw conclusions based on these behaviors
and actions to use them in making correct decisions. Accounting for attacker
characteristics/actions requires a descriptive model that maps them to an accurate
computer model that correctly simulates them. On the other hand, drawing conclusions
and getting guidance about which decisions are appropriate for a specific situation
requires the use of a prescriptive model. Hence, we add a prescriptive component to the
model represented by the variables aimed at guiding the HS personnel to make decisions.
In addition to that, another descriptive sub-model is responsible for describing realworld-related factors and events that affect the interaction. The overall objective of the
model, with its prescriptive and descriptive components, is to assist HS agencies in
planning for the deployment of a suitable protective technology. This is obtained based
on the knowledge of the probable attacks that could happen in some time frame. Another
goal is to give them an idea about the vulnerability of the transportation network. System
dynamics is utilized to build the model as it enables the inclusion of numerous model
variables and the specification of their interrelations in a straightforward manner. This
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makes it easier for the modeler to focus on the proper design of the model. Another
advantage is that system dynamics facilitates the conduction of sensitivity analyses to
study the influence of different factors affecting the interaction.
In the second part, the approach is mainly based on Geographic Information
Systems (GIS) data and computational geometry. The problem of sensor deployment is
application specific. It is nearly impossible to find a single deployment strategy that fits
all applications. As we selected transportation network links as our application context, it
was necessary to find a realistic approach for deploying the sensors. It is not possible to
have a network-wide deployment for the purpose of testing; this would be very expensive
and impractical. Therefore, it was concluded that a modeling and simulation approach
would be the best choice, especially for city scale we consider. The high level summery
of the approach is as follows: First, a shape file (which is one form of representing GIS
data such as city borders, road network links, buildings, etc.) is used to read the road
network links; Second: some computational geometry operations take place on the read
data; Finally, two suggested sensor deployments are output in the form of shape files
containing the distributions of sensors and the locations of the Base Stations (BSs) and
Command Centers (CCs) based on a specific coordinate system. Outputs are also
provided in the form of deployment radii, grid cell center locations, and sensor densities
in a text format.
4.2. Detailed Discussion of Sub-problem Solution Approaches
In this section, we discuss in details the selected solution approaches for the two main
parts of the work. We start with the attacker-defender interaction model, where we
present the model specification, then the model is formulated and the underlying
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equations are provided and discussed. Followed by that is the discussion of the sensor
deployment approach. In that subsection, we first explain the main idea behind the
selection of the proposed approach, and then provide the details of the deployment and all
constituent algorithms.
4.2.1. Attacker-Defender Interaction
This subsection presents the model specification, the underlying equations of each
sub-model, and the detailed explanation of the rationale for and the meaning of each
variable.
4.2.1.1. Model Specification:
The attacker-defender interaction model, also called the Perception squared
Interaction cubed P2I3 model (Tolba et al., 2011) or simply the perception model, utilizes
system dynamics as the underlying modeling approach. This enables the modeling of the
complex interactions between the homeland security (HS) agency and the attacker. This
approach depends mainly on differential equations where rate variables control the levels
of the dependent variables. VenSim™1 was used as the platform of the simulation. In the
proposed model it was assumed that the attacker targets transportation network links
only. This will be extended to other network elements in future work. A rational attacker
was also assumed. As the model is intended to provide the infrastructure protection (HS)
agency with a time plan for technology deployment, the considered time period was set to
10 years as a reasonable period for a medium- to large-sized networks (hundreds to few
thousands of links). Any other length for that period would have worked equally well.

1

http://www.vensim.com/
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Figure 11: Attacker-defender interaction model’s block diagram

The model consists of three sub-models: the HS-perception model, the attackerperception model, and the real-world model. These three models are interconnected and
unite to form the attacker-defender model. Fig. 11 shows the model’s block diagram. The
model defines three different probabilities of attack success. Two of them represent the
probabilities based on the perceptions of the two opponents. The third is assumed to be
the actual probability based on their actions and on other uncontrolled factors. Finally,
none of the two participants is assumed to have complete information about the
accomplishments of the other. Table 1 lists the abbreviations used from here on for the
frequently repeated terms of the model.

Table 1: Model Abbreviations
Abbreviation
HS-S
HS-P
HS-A
HS-T
A-S
A-P
ACT

Meaning
Homeland Security Seen
Homeland Security Perceived
Homeland Security Assumed
Homeland Security Tolerable
Attacker Seen
Attacker Perceived
Actual
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4.2.1.2. Model Operation, Variables, and Equations:
Model operation, variables, and equations are explained in details in this subsection. This
is first done for the HS perception model, then for the attacker perception model, and
finally, for the real-world model. In order to make the discussion clear and useful, we
classify the variables used in the attacker-defender model into three categories: mixed
variables, pure sub-model variables, and interaction (simulation) variables as shown in
Fig. 12. Mixed variables are shared among two or more sub-models. Pure model
variables only belong to one of the sub-models. The variables in the third category belong
to the interaction itself, such as its time period. In addition, in the following discussion,
we point out each model’s indicator, input, and output variables.

Figure 12: Categories of the variables used in the HS-Attacker interaction model

a. Homeland-Security-Perception Model:
The first sub-model addresses the perception of the HS personnel, the resulting
decisions, and the factors affecting these decisions. The flow chart of this model is shown
in Fig. 13. The operation of the model will be discussed through its variables with the
assistance of the flow chart.
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Figure 13: HS-Perception Model flow chart
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HS has its own view of the probability of attack success. This may be significantly
different from the A-S probability and/or the actual probability of attack success. In this
sub-model, the HS Assumed (HS-A) growth rate in attacker’s knowledge affects the HS
Perceived (HS-P) amount of information that the attacker gains over time. We are
assuming that knowledge always increases as this is the natural case except in some rare
situations. As the amount of information the attacker has gained exceeds an HS-specified
amount, and based on the HS-A effect of gaining this information on the time needed to
plan and commit an attack, a danger alert can be fired. If this happens, a modification is
made to the steady-state link protection rate. Then, based on the maximum tolerable
number of damaged links in the period of study, a protection adjustment is made. This in
turn, changes the number of links that are protected, which affects the probability of
attack success from the HS agency’s point of view. This loop keeps updating itself over
the period of study until all the links in the network become protected. Although the
model runs until all links are protected, it provides the HS agency with graphs of the
probability of attack success and number of protected links versus time, which can be
used to stop at an acceptable probability of attack success instead of protecting all links.
Budget and technology deployment feasibility govern this decision. This model gives a
planning road-map that tells the HS agency when to change the protection deployment
rate and when to keep it constant over some period of time. This will achieve the highest
benefit when the HS-A (based on intelligence procedures and on experience) rate of
growth in attacker’s knowledge is very close to the actual one. It also provides the
probability of attack success as could be seen by the HS agency as a function of all the
data collected by that agency and the preparation done up to the time of conducting the
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simulation. The main input to this model is the “HS-A Growth in Attacker’s Knowledge
Power”. This differs from the variable “Growth in Attacker’s Knowledge Power” that
appears as a joint variable in the attacker-perception model and the real-world model in
how HS acquires it. Although both rates are assumed, there is an inherent difference
between them. The “HS-A Growth in Attacker’s Knowledge Power” is obtained based on
the intelligence information the HS agency has collected about the attacker and the
environment by the time the simulation is conducted. We call it assumed because the
information collected by the HS agency is never complete. So, there is an assumption
component in this rate. The other rate can be considered as a reference or as the rate HS
believes is the actual rate of growth in attacker’s information both in the attacker’s
perception and in reality (it is also considered the actual rate for simplicity, although it
can be split into two). So, we are trying to answer the question:
“If there is a rate that the attacker thinks is the rate he can gain information at in some
period of time, and HS has its perceived rate of growth of this information based on
collected data, what is the chance that the attacker will succeed, from HS’s perspective,
from his perspective, and in reality if these assumptions are true?”
The unit “BitsOfInfo/Year” is used to express this growth rate. For simplicity, we
expressed the confidence of an attacker in terms of the “BitsOfInfo” he has. Therefore,
the variable HS-A Attacker’s Confidence is no more than the integral of this rate over the
study period. The HS-S Knowledge Factor represents the effect of the difference in
knowledge level between that needed to overcome protection from HS’s point of view
and that of the attacker on the time of planning and committing an attack. This is based
on an assumed fixed amount of reduction in the needed time per a bit of information
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increase as expressed in the variable “HS-S Effect of Knowledge on Time”. The HS-S
Knowledge Factor changes the reference amount of time required to plan and commit an
attack (which is the initial value for that variable based on intelligence information). If
this time becomes less than the time the HS agency knows is required to discover and
cease attack, the danger alert is fired. After the danger alert is fired, based on whether
there is a steady state rate that the HS agency uses for deploying technology, and based
on the HS Tolerable (HS-T) increase in this rate, the number of additional links that can
be protected is decided. Of course, the tolerable increase in the protection rate is
governed by budget in real life. The maximum allowable number of damaged links over
the period of study determines the fraction of the protection adjustment calculated that
will be actually used. The used fraction specifies how many additional links will actually
be protected. The most important variable in this sub-model is the HS-S Probability of
Attack Success. It depends on four variables: the HS-S Uncertainties; which represents
the effect of incomplete information on the probability of attack success, the numbers of
protected and unprotected links, and benefit of adding ambiguity to the deployed
technology so that it becomes non obvious to the attacker whether a specific link is
protected or not (this is represented by the variable Oe : Protected-Link-Obfuscation
Effect). The following list summarizes the types, meanings, and the governing equations
of each variable used in this sub-model.


HS  A
HS-A Growth in Attacker’s Knowledge Power, G RK
(t ) : The main input in this sub-

model. It should be based on intelligence information collected by the HS agency and is
measured in “BitsOfInfo / Year”. It is therefore expected to be input as a set of values
representing that variable growth rate over the time period under consideration.
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HS-A Attacker’s Confidence, C AHS  A : This is a level variable measured in

“BitsOfInfo” and is intended to represent the HS agency’s perception about the amount
of information the attacker is going to gain over the technology deployment period. Eq. 4
expresses attacker’s confidence as a function of the growth rate in his knowledge.
C

HS  A
A

t

HS  A
  G RK
(t )dt

(4)

0



HS-S Knowledge Power Needed to Overcome Protection, PKHS  S : A constant

reflecting the amount of information the HS agency believes is sufficient to overcome the
deployed protection. It is measured in “BitsOfInfo”.


HS-S Effect of Knowledge on Time, E KHS  S : A constant representing the reduction

effect that gaining information (by the attacker) has on the time needed to plan and
commit attack.


HS-S Knowledge Factor, FKHS  S : A factor representing the additional time added (to

the minimum time needed to plan and commit attack if the attacker has all the desired
information to attack) if there is still some information that the attacker needs to acquire
to be able to overcome the deployed technology. This factor is the difference between the
desired information to overcome technology and the information the attacker has, all
multiplied by the expected amount of reduction in desired time per bit of information. Eq.
5 shows this relation.
FKHS  S  ( PKHS  S  C AHS  A )  E KHS  S


(5)

HS  S
HS-S Reference Minimum Time To Plan and Commit Attack, TˆPCA
: The time

needed by the attacker (in HS’s perception) for preparing a plan and executing it if he has
the desired information to overcome the deployed technology. It is measured in “Years”
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and is computed based on the amount of information needed to overcome the protection
and the reduction in needed time per bit of information as given in Eq. 6.
HS  S
TˆPCA
 E KHS  S  PKHS  S



(6)

HS  S
HS-S Minimum Time To Plan and Commit Attack, TPCA
: This variable represents

the minimum time needed by the attacker in HS agency’s perception to plan for and
commit an attack. If the attacker has the desired information to overcome the deployed
technology (in HS’s perception) or even more information then there must be a minimum
time to create the plan and actually execute the attack. On the other hand if the attacker
doesn’t have the necessary information then this time gets longer. This variable is
measured in “Years” and is expressed by Eq. 7.
HS  S
TˆPCA
, FKHS  S  0
HS  S
TPCA

HS  S
TˆPCA
 FKHS  S , otherwise



(7)

HS  S
: A constant that
HS-S Time to Discover Attack Planning and Cease Attack, TDPCA

represents the expected amount of time needed to discover planning for an attack and
ceasing the attack. It is measured in “Years”.


Danger Alert, Ad : An dimensionless indicator variable that is intended to represent

an alarm or a strategy change motivator for the HS agency. When the minimum time to
plan and commit attack becomes less the time needed by the HS agency to discover
attack planning and cease that attack, this alert is fired; i.e. it takes a value of 1, otherwise
it is zero. It is shown in Eq. 8.
1
Ad  
0

HS  S
HS  S
, TPCA
 TDPCA

, otherwise

(8)
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HS-T Increase Protection Rate, RIPHS T : A constant specifying the affordable increase

in the steady state number of links that get protected per year without excess burden on
the HS agency. The unit for this variable is “Links/Year”.


Steady State Protection Rate, RSSP : A constant reflecting the regular rate at which the

HS agency has been protecting links each year. It could be set to zero if no rate was used
before.


Rate of Link Protection, RLP : The compound rate of link protection in “Links/Year”.

This rate is the steady state rate added to which the tolerable increase in the rate
conditional on an alert and is controlled by the current value HS perceived probability of
attack success. This variable serves as a first level control over the number of links that
are actually protected. The second level is the maximum tolerable number of damaged
links over a period of time if any. Eq. 9 illustrates this relation.

R LP  PASHS  S  (( Ad  RIPHS T )  RSSP )


(9)

Number of Additional Links that Could be Protected, N AL : This is a level variable

controlled by the rate of link protection previously defined. It is an integration of that rate
over the technology deployment time period. This associated unit is “Links”. This is
shown in Eq. 10.
t

N AL   R LP (t )dt

(10)

0




Maximum Allowable Damaged Links, N DL
: A constant specifying the maximum

number of links that the HS agency can accept to be damaged over the deployment
period. Of course it could be set equal to zero if no tolerance is allowed. There is also an
upper bound on this number that can be specified in the model.
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Protection Adjustment, AP : The number of links that will actually be additionally

protected. This is controlled by the ratio the average number of damaged links over a prespecified previous period of time and the maximum tolerable number damaged links over
the deployment period. Eq. 11 describes this relation.




N AL 
Nˆ DL  N DL
AP  
(11)
otherwise
0
Average Number of Damaged Links Over a Period, N̂ DL : The average number of

links that are actually damaged over a pre-specified period p (measured in “Years”) of
time. This is given by Eq. 12 and 13 as the difference between the current and the p years ago number of damaged links divided by that period.
P
( N DL  N DL
)
Nˆ DL 
p
P
N DL  N DL (t  p)



(12)
(13)

HS-S Uncertainties, U HS  S : A dimensionless constant greater than zero and less than

or equal to one that reflects the effect of incomplete information on HS’s side on its
perceived probability of attack success.


Protected-Link-Obfuscation Effect, Oe : An input constant that represents the

expected effect of the utilization of some protection technology obfuscation technique on
the probability of attack success. It is a positive integer lying in a pre-specified interval of
values associated such effects (taken to be form 1 to 10 in this model). The value of this
constant should be based on the collected information about results of obfuscation efforts
done by the HS agency on the behavior of the attacker.


Number of Unprotected Links, N UP : This variable measures the number of

unprotected links in the network. It is either equal to the previous year’s value if there is
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no need to protect more links or its value is decreased if an adjustment is done to the
protection (i.e. more links will get protected this year). This is of course conditional on
the presence of unprotected links. Eq. 14, 15, and 16 show these relations.

N UP  
0

p
N UP
0

(14)

otherwise

Where:


 

AP  0
p

 N UP

p
 N UP
  AP 
 
0



(15)

otherwise

 AP   N UP
p

otherwise

(16)

p
Previous Number of Unprotected Links, N UP
: Specifies the previous year’s number

i
. The equation of
of unprotected links. Initially, it is specified by the input variable N UP

this variable is given in 17.
N i
p
N UP
  UP
 N UP (t  1)


t0
otherwise

(17)

Number of Protected Links, N P : Is given by the difference between the total number

of links NL, which is an input, and the number of unprotected links as given by 18.
N P  N L  N UP 


(18)

HS-S Probability of Attack Success, PsHS  S : An output variable representing the

probability of attack success perceived by the HS agency based on the previous
calculations in the above variables. It increases when the number of unprotected links is a
large fraction of the total. When the protected link obfuscation effect is large, the
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probability decreases. Finally, if the HS agency is highly uncertain about the information
it has about the attacker, the probability become very high. This is expressed by Eq. 19.
PsHS  S 


N UP  U HS  S
( N P  N UP )  Oe

(19)

Protected Link Obfuscation Function, O f : An input variable that models the effect of

deploying some illusive devices, e.g. empty black boxes, to deceive that attacker and
make him think that some links are protected while they are not. This variable is
expressed as a function of (an operator on) the number of protected, unprotected links,
and the danger alert. The danger alert is incorporated to account for the required increase
in this obfuscation when the HS-S minimum time to plan and commit attack becomes less
than the time needed to discover that attack. The form of this function should be based on
the experiences of the HS agency and its experiences. It is one of the difficulties HS
agency would face as it is required to find a proper formulation that reflects the actual
effect of deception techniques used on the attacker. In the simulation, an arbitrary
function was used. This unit used to measure this variable is “links” as the output of the
function should represent the number of links the attacker will perceive as protected
links. Eq. 20 shows this functional relation.
O f  f ( Ad , N UP , N P )

(20)

b. Attacker-Perception Model:
The attacker has his own view and factors that affect his decisions. A very similar set
of variables to the ones used in the HS-perception model exist on the attacker’s side, but
this time they represent the attacker’s point of view. They reflect the data that is collected
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Figure 14: Attacker-Perception Model flow chart

by the attacker and how this data affects his decisions. The flow chart of this model is
shown in Fig. 14.
Although it could be criticized that the P2I3-Model is designed to be used by the HS
agency, using the information it has, and that this sub-model needs information that if
known by the HS agency there would be no conflict at all, we clarify that the data used in
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the attacker sub-model is data that would be derived from past experience with different
attackers and is used to enable the evaluation of a protection deployment plan before it is
actually implemented. More precisely, the attacker-related information in this model is in
fact the scale that the HS agency uses to assess its proposed methodology of reducing the
probability of attack success. As was the case with the HS-perception model, this submodel has the “Growth in Attacker’s Knowledge Power” as an input. Instead of having
three rates; one for the HS agency, one for the attacker, and an actual rate, we made the
second two as the joint variable mentioned above. This was done first for simplicity and
second to represent a powerful attacker that has very good knowledge about the actual
factors that control the growth rate of his knowledge. This rate, again, affects the
attacker’s confidence, then the A-S Knowledge Factor, the A-S Minimum time to Plan
and Commit Attack, and finally the A-S probability of attack success. The A-S
Probability of Attack Success is a function of the A-S Minimum time to Plan and
Commit Attack, the A-S Uncertainties, Attacker Perceived (A-P) Time to Discover
Attack Planning and Cease Attack, and the A-S Number of Protected and Unprotected
Links.
It should be noticed that the attacker’s perceptions, based on real-world factors, which
were affected by the actions of the HS agency, helped him to estimate the probability that
his attack will succeed. Next, the attacker makes a decision based on that probability of
attack success, the number of links that he is considering for targeting, the available
chances, and the inclination to take the risk. This decision determines the actual variable
rate at which he will commit attacks which, in turn, determines the actual rate of link
damage. Therefore, the decisions were converted to actions. The link damage rate
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determines the actual number of damaged links over the study period. The number of
damaged links affects the protection adjustment HS agency makes to the network and
hence the number of protected links. The number of protected and unprotected links
affect the A-P probability of attack success through the ”Protected Link Obfuscation
Function” as will be seen in section 4.2.1.3. This means that the attacker’s actions affect
his future behavior indirectly. Again, the variables and equations of this sub-model are
summarized below.


Growth in Attacker’s Knowledge Power, G RK (t ) : The main input to this sub-model.

It represents the variables rate at which the attacker believes his information will grow in
the period under study. It is measured in “BitsOfInfo/Year”. The values of this variable
should be based on the experience information of the HS agency. These values are input
as a rate value per year over the interaction period. Arbitrary variable rate was used in the
simulations.


HS  A
Attacker’s Confidence, C A : Attacker’s confidence is similar to G RK
(t ) but here it

is from the attacker’s point of view. It is measured in “BitsOfInfo” and is the integration
of the rate of growth in attacker’s knowledge power. This is shown in Eq. 21.
t

C A   G RK (t )dt

(21)

0



A-S Effect of Knowledge on Time, E KA S : This is an input variable that represents the

reduction effect that gaining information (by the attacker) has on the time needed to plan
and commit attack from the attacker’s point of view. It is measured in
“Years/BitsOfInfo”. The value of this variable is a constant the value of which is
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determined from experiences of the HS with previous attackers and their perception of
that effect.


A-S Knowledge Power Needed to Overcome Protection, PKA S : The amount of

information the attacker believes is sufficient to overcome the deployed protection
measured in “BitsOfInfo”. It is an input constant.


A-S Knowledge Factor, FKA S : Represents the additional time added to the minimum

ever time needed to plan and commit an attack if all necessary knowledge is available
due to the difference in knowledge between the attacker and the required knowledge to
overcome the protection. It is measured in “Years” and is calculated using Eq. 22.
FKA S  ( PKA S  C A )  E KA S



(22)

A S
A-S Reference Minimum Time To Plan and Commit Attack, TˆPCAr
: An input variable

similar to the one given in Eq. 6 that represents the time needed by the attacker, but this
time in his perception, for preparing a plan and executing it if he has the desired
information to overcome the deployed technology. Again, it is measured in “Years”.
Here, it is a constant that should be based on previous experiences of the HS agency with
the considered attacker.


A S
A-S Minimum Time To Plan and Commit Attack, TˆPCA
: The minimum time needed

from attacker’s perspective to plan for and commit an attack. It is equal to the minimum
ever time that the attacker needs to prepare a plan and execute it – called reference
minimum time - when all information is available. On the other hand, if the information
needed to overcome protection is not available in full, this time becomes equal to that
reference minimum time plus the time needed to acquire the rest of the information
required (called A-S Knowledge Factor). This is given by Eq. 23
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A S
TˆPCAr
 FKA S
A S
TˆPCA

A S
TˆPCAr



FKA S  0
otherwise

(23)

Deception Factor, FD : An input constant that represents the multiplicative increase in

the actual time needed to discover attack planning and to cease the attack, as perceived by
the attacker. This increase is due to deception carried out by the HS agency to hide the
actual time needed. The value of this constant should be based on intelligence efforts of
the HS agency. It is a dimensionless variable.


A P
A-P Time to Discover Attack Planning and Cease Attack, TDPCA
: Attacker’s

perception of the minimum time needed by the HS agency to discover his planning for an
attack and to cease that attack. This time is measured in “Years” and is the multiplication
ACT
of the deception factor and the actual time needed by the HS agency TDPCA
as shown in

Eq. 24.
A P
ACT
TDPCA
 TDPCA
 FD



(24)

A-S Uncertainties, U A S : The input representing the effect of lack of information on

the attacker’s side on the probability of his success in the attack PsA S . This input
constant is “Dimensionless” as should depend on HS’s past experiences. It takes values
between 0 and one, where 0 means full certainty and 1 represents complete uncertainty
about the acquired information.


A-P Number of Protected Links, N PA P : Represents the perceived number of

protected links by the attacker. It was made equal to the link obfuscation function’s
output in this model. As mentioned before, the link obfuscation function is determined by
the HS agency and is intended to try to address the perceived protection by the attacker.
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So, it is not the same as the actual perception of the attacker but has been set equal to the
A-P number of protected links for model simplicity.


A P
A-P Number of Unprotected Links, N UP
: Clearly, this is equal to the rest of the

links as shown in Eq. 25.
A P
N UP
 N L  N PA P



(25)

A-S Probability of Attack Success, PsA S : This variable expresses the probability that

an attack will be successful for the attacker’s point of view and based on his
perception/collected information. It is a function of the A-S Minimum time to Plan and
Commit Attack, the A-S Uncertainties, A-S Time to Discover Attack Planning and Cease
Attack, and the A-S Number of Protected and Unprotected Links. Eq. 26 represents the
probability as a function of these variables. It is clear that as the ratio of the number of
the A-S number of unprotected links to the total number of links become larger, the
probability of success increases. When the time to discover attack planning and cease the
attack becomes larger than the time needed to plan and commit attack, the probability of
attack success increases. Finally, when the uncertainty increases, this probability
decreases.
PsA S 

A P
A P
N UP
 TDPCA
 (1  U A S )
( N A P  N A P )  (T A P  Tˆ A S )
UP



P

DPCA

(26)

PCA

Chances, C : This variable is equal the value of a uniform random variable that takes

values from 0 to 100 if that value is greater than a pre-specified threshold, and is zero
otherwise. The variable represents the chances exploited by the attacker. This variable is
measured by the number of chances per year i.e. the unit is “1/Year”. Eq. 27 shows this
variable.

62
X
C C
0



X C  TC
otherwise

(27)

Chance Threshold, TC : An input constant that specifies the strength of a chance that

makes the attacker willing to take it. This should be based on HS agency’s with different
attackers and the attractiveness of different chances to them. It takes values between 0
and 100 as well.


Risk Taking Factor, FR : A dimensionless input constant the value of which

determines the inclination of the attacker to take the risk and commit an attack even when
there is a possibility that this attack will fail. A scale from 0 to 10 for example could be
used to represent different levels of inclination. A value of 3 was used in the simulation.


Number of Targeted Links, N tL : An input representing the variable number of links

considered for targeting over time. As was the case with the link obfuscation function, an
arbitrary function was used to model this variable. In this case, it is a step function that
changes over time. The determination of this input is based on intelligence information
about system elements - links here - that represent high value for the attacker.


ACT
ACT Rate of Committing an Attack, RCA
: The actual rate at which the attacker

commits an attack is governed by his perception of the probability of attack success, by
the chances he is willing to take, and by the inclination to take a risk even when success
is not guaranteed. This is shown in Eq. 28. This rate is measured in number of attacks per
year, i.e. “1/Year”.
ACT
RCA
 PsA S  C  FR  N tL



(28)

ACT
ACT Link Damage Rate, R LD
: The rate at which the links are actually damaged. It is

governed by the actual probability of attack success. The probability specifies a fraction
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of the rate at which the attacker tries to commit attacks to be the actual rate of damaging
links. This rate is measured in “Links/Year” and is given by Eq. 29. This variable is more
a mixed variable than an attacker-model variable as it is a common variable between this
model and the real-world model.
ACT
ACT
R LD
 RCA
 PsACT



(29)

Number of Damaged Links Over Time, N DL : The number of damaged links over

time is determined by the actual link damage rate. The former is a level variable and is
therefore the integral of that rate over time. Eq.30 shows this relation.
t

ACT
N DL   R LD
dt

(30)

0

c. Real-World Model:
The third and last model is concerned with the representation of real world, and what
is actually happening away from the perceptions of the opponents. Again, we restate that
although the variables in this sub-model will not likely be known by any of the two sides
of the interaction, the HS agency will be using values that are based on experience to
serve as a firmer reference than that of the attacker to assess its gained information and its
methodology. The flow chart of the RW model is shown in Fig. 15. Most of the variables
in this model are similar in the way they function to their counterparts in the two previous
models. The ACT probability of attack success is affected by many factors: the number
of protected and unprotected links, the actual time to discover attack planning and cease
attack (this time increases exponentially over a long period (>>10 years) of time in this
model to account for the time evolving opposing conditions that may hamper HS
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Figure 15: RW Model flow chart

agency’s efforts to discover the attack), the actual minimum time to plan and commit
attack, and on ‘other factors’ (these are factors that could be added in the future to refine
the model. In the current model they are represented as a constant equal to 0.1. The
complement ’0.9’ of this constant is multiplied by the remaining terms that affect the
actual probability). A summary of the real-world model variables and equations is given
below.


ACT Knowledge Power Needed to Overcome Protection, PKACT : A constant similar to

the knowledge power of the other two sub-models, but in this case represents the actual
or the correct level needed to overcome the protection. It is again measured in
“BitsOfInfo”.


ACT Effect of Knowledge on Time, E KACT : An input constant expressing the actual

reduction effect “Years/BitsOfInfo” on the time needed to overcome protection as a result
of gaining information on the attacker’s side.


Knowledge Factor, FK : The reduction in the time needed to overcome protection as a

result of gaining information. Eq. 31 describes this variable.
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FK  ( PKACT  C A )  E KACT


(31)

ACT
ACT Minimum Time To Plan and Commit Attack, TˆPCA
: The ‘actual’ version of the

similar variable in the attacker-model. It is a function of the actual reference minimum
time to plan and commit attack and the knowledge factor as was the case with the A-S
minimum time to plan and commit attack. Eq. 32 follows is very similar to Eq. 23.
ACT
TˆPCAr
 FK
ACT
ˆ
TPCA  
ACT
TˆPCAr



FK  0
otherwise

(32)

ACT Probability of Success, PsACT : A real-world model output variable that models

the actual probability of attack success. It is a function of the actual number of protected
and unprotected links, the actual times for planning and committing an attack and for
discovering that attack and ceasing it, and finally, on other factors. These other factors
represent any non-modeled contributors to the actual success probability. They were
included to enable adding more terms to the probability in the future to refine the model.
The variable ‘other factors’ takes values from 0 to 0.995. The lower limit indicates no
effect for these factors on the probability, while the upper limit indicates a very strong
effect on the probability. The actual probability of attack success is given by Eq. 33.
PsACT 

N UP
T ACT
 ACT DPCA ACT  (1  FO )
( N UP  N P ) (TDPCA  TˆPCA )

(33)

4.2.1.3. Inter-Model Relationships:
The interdependencies between the three sub-models are discussed in this subsection. Three main inter-model relationships are of interest: a relationship through the
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number of protected and unprotected links, another relationship through the protected
link obfuscation function, and a third through actual link damage rate.
a. Number of Links and Protected/Unprotected Links:
The number of links and the number of protected/unprotected links affect the HS-S
probability of attack success and the ACT probability of attack success directly. They
also affect the A-S probability of attack success indirectly through the so called link
obfuscation function. When the HS agency makes a protection adjustment to the network,
this is reflected in the three probabilities. Therefore, the perception of the HS agency
generates actions that make a real-world change that in turn affects the perception of the
attacker, and changes the actual situation. On the other hand, the affected perception of
the attacker imposes a change on his actions, which also affects the real-world. This gives
an insight into the nature of the interaction between the two entities in the surrounding
frame.
b. Link Obfuscation Function:
The “Protected Link Obfuscation Function” is an HS-perception model variable. It is
a mathematical representation of the effect of installing illusive devices, e.g. empty black
boxes, to mislead the attacker and make protected and unprotected links
indistinguishable. This function operates on protected and unprotected links, and affects
the perception of the attacker about the number of protected links. This, as a result,
contributes to the formation of the perception of the probability of attack success from his
perspective. It is clear again how an action done by the HS agency has an effect on the
perception of the attacker, and hence actions, through the real world.
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Finding a suitable mathematical formulation for the effect of this deployed
obfuscation on attacker’s perception is one difficulty that may require a considerable
effort from HS. In this model, we used an arbitrary function that acts as an operator on
the number of protected and unprotected links and produces misleading numbers of these
links while not being too far from actual values to maintain realism.
c. Link Damage Rate:
The ACT Link Damage Rate depends directly on the ACT Probability of Attack
Success, and in- directly on the A-S Probability of Attack Success. Also, the ACT
Probability of Attack Success depends on the number of protected and unprotected links
which are the result of the efforts of the HS agency.
4.2.1.4. Model Critique:
The P2I3−Model can effectively describe the interactions between the homeland
security agency responsible for protecting the system under consideration and the
attacker. It also provides the agency with a deployment road-map and triggers the
decision correction process. There are, however, some considerations that, if incorporated
in the model, would make it more powerful and more realistic. For example, in the base
model, the deployment road-map only provides a time frame for protecting links and the
necessary levels of that deployment at each point, however, it does not provide an order
in which these links should be protected nor includes link importance ranking in the
deployment decision process. Including such ranks and order of deployment would be
very helpful in increasing network vulnerability and would definitely affect the
inclination of the attacker to take the risk and the probabilities of attack success. Also, the

68
base model dealt only with one attacker type which is not realistic. Having multiple
attacker types each with their own set of variables should serve the realism of the model.
Considering different network elements instead of only links and considering the nonattack alternative are two other important considerations (Jenelius et al.). Finally, the
baseline model did not deal with links as actual entities; instead, it dealt with the number
of links. More precisely, when the attacker considers some links for targeting, the model
uses only the number of such links without specifying them individually. This is not
accurate as it gives attacking any set of links the same importance to the attacker which is
unrealistic. Therefore, the model should deal with links as separate entities and with link
numbers.
4.2.1.5. Model Refinement:
In this section we focus on refining the model by considering link ranks. The model
was originally developed using VenSim™. In order to have more freedom in extending
the model and be able to integrate it with other existing models, we wrote our Java™
version of the P2I3−Model.
Protection deployment is not an even process where the available technology is just
deployed in a random order and with the same technological level for all system
elements. It should follow a well-studied methodology to achieve the desired goal. There
are two perspectives from which this problem should be tackled. The first is the order of
link protection and the second is the technology grade used for each system level. We
consider the former only in this work. To incorporate link ranks; which represent the
level of link importance to the attacker, in the baseline model, the output of the
previously discussed (see Chapter II) vulnerability assessment model (Wang et al. 2011)
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is used as an input to this model with a slight modification. The original output is a list of
link failure probabilities. The failure probability of each link was mapped to a
corresponding ‘link weight’. Links with higher probabilities of failure get higher weights.
This link-weight list was used along with the deployment road-map resulting from the
baseline model to provide a more specific deployment plan to the HS agency. In addition,
these weights were used to model the effect of protecting the highly vulnerable links first
on the probabilities of attack success for each of the three sub models. A new term that
stresses the effect of link rank/weight on the probability of attack success was added. Eqs.
34, 35, and 36 show the three probabilities with the effect of link ranks included:
PsHS  S 

PsA S 

PsACT 

N UP  WUP  U HS  S
( N P  N UP )  (WUP  WP )  Oe
A P
A P
N UP
 WUP  TDPCA
 (1  U A S )

A P
A P
A S
( N UP
 N PA P )  (WUP  WP )  (TDPCA
 TˆPCA
)

( N UP

N UP  WUP
T ACT
 ACT DPCA ACT  (1  FO )
 N P )  (WUP  WP ) (TDPCA  TˆPCA )

(34)

(35)

(36)

Where:
WUP : Sum of the weights of the currently unprotected links.
WP :

Sum of the weights of the currently protected links.

The mapping process from link failure probabilities is simple. The idea is to put more
emphasis on links with higher failure probabilities. The links are first sorted in a
descending order of their failure probabilities. Then they are ranked, from one to the
number of links, based on this sorted order. The simple formula given in Eq. 37 is then
used to find the corresponding link weights.
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Pi f
Wi  100 
Ri

(37)

Where:
Wi :

Weight of link i

Pi f :

Failure probability of link i

Ri :

Rank of link i

An example of this ranking process and the resulting emphasis on links with higher
failure probabilities is shown in Fig. 16, where a set of 55 links were used as a sample. It
is clear from the figure that, as expected, for the highly ranked links, i.e. links with high
failure probability, the corresponding weights are very high, while for lower rank links,
the weights decrease rapidly. This has the effect of emphasizing highly ranked links as
mentioned above.
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Figure 16: Sample link weighing process. a) Link failure probabilities, b) Corresponding
link weights
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4.2.2. Sensor Deployment
The problem of sensor deployment is application specific. A deployment valid for
environmental monitoring or structure robustness reporting is not suitable for a target
tracking or a traffic monitoring application. The problem under consideration: traffic
network protection, is a sensitive problem where any delay or lack of information could
cause a disaster or mass loss of lives. The specific context of monitoring explosive
devices which has been selected requires that some specific links of high importance get
more attention than other less important ones. It also requires that the protection of these
links not be only present at the links themselves or their vicinity, but to extend up to a
suitable distance that ensures that the attacker is detected and ceased far enough from the
place of interest. Due to the above requirements, and due to other WSN design
considerations such as network longevity or lifetime extension as well as ‘hole’
prevention, and network reliability, we chose the proposed deployment techniques for
transportation network links. In the following sections, we will discuss the two proposed
deployment methods in details, and provide the rationale for choosing each of them
WSN-wise and security-wise. It is necessary, however, to first introduce computational
geometry (CG) and some of its algorithms and concepts to aid the understating of the
proposed protocols.
4.2.2.1. Computational Geometry:
Computational geometry is the branch of computational science responsible for
dealing with different geometry aspects such as: 1) the representation of geometric
primitives like points, lines, polygons, curves, etc., 2) the associated algorithms, 3)
geometry relationships such as geometry intersections, unions, distances, etc., and 4)
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geometry operations like: finding the centroid of a shape, the convex hull of a group of
points, Delaunay triangulation, Voronoi diagrams, shape simplification, etc. In the next
set of subsections, we describe some of the CG algorithms that we exploit in our sensor
deployment algorithms.
4.2.2.1.1. Skeletons:
One can think of a skeleton in the exact way a human skeleton can be though of. This
is one of the reasons it is called a skeleton. Skeletons describe the main structure of a
shape. In the same way a human skeleton gives a very good idea of how a human looks,
skeletons of geometric shapes provide information about the general features of a shape.
On the other hand, much like the skeletons of human beings do not show the exact details
of how their facial features are, for example, shape skeletons do not necessary describe
the minute local information of a shape (although some implementations can do so);
instead they describe the global information. To illustrate the idea of skeletons, we
borrow the prairie example from Gonzalez and Woods (2008): Imagine that a fire catches
the boundaries of a uniform, dry grass field; the fire fronts will start moving inwards at
the same speed. The set of points where the fire fronts meet ‘reach at the same time’
represents the skeleton of the field’s shape. The formal definition of a skeleton as
provided by Gonzalez and Woods is based on the definition of the so called medial axis
transform (MAT) proposed by Blum (1967) as follows:
“The MAT of a region R with border B is as follows: For each point p in R, we find
its closest neighbor in B. If p has more than one such neighbor, it is said to belong to the
medial axis (skeleton) of R”
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In the above definition, closeness is determined by the definition of distance. In this
work we deal with Euclidean distances only.
It is worth to mention that there are many algorithms that were developed to obtain
the skeleton of a shape. We refer the reader to Ref. (Gonzalez and Woods, 2008) for
more information about these algorithms. Fig. 17 provides some examples of shape
skeletons generated using the ImageJ free image processing and analysis tool1.

Figure 17: Examples of shape skeletons.2
4.2.2.1.2. Convex Hull:
Another very important concept in CG is the convex hull. For a set of points, one can
think of a convex hull as a rubber band that tightly encloses this set of points. In order to
provide a formal definition of the convex hull, two basic concepts should be clarified
1

ImageJ; Image Processing and Analysis in Java: http://rsbweb.nih.gov/ij/
Leaf: http://rsbweb.nih.gov/ij/; wing nut: http://photo-dictionary.com/; humidity sensor:
http://www.directindustry.com/
2
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first; convex set and convex combination (Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004)). A convex set
is a set of points containing all the line segments (and their points of course) connecting
any two points of the set. This is expressed mathematically as:

x1  (1   ) x 2  C

 x1 , x 2  C

,0    1

(38)

Figs. 18 (a) and (b) show an example of a convex and a non-convex set. A convex
combination on the other hand is defined as follows:
Given a set of points x1 , x 2 ,..., x n any point of the form:

x  1 x1   2 x 2  ...   n x n ,

1   2  ...   n  1,  i  0

(39)

represents a convex combination of the n points.
The two above definitions lead to the definition of a convex hull. A convex hall of a set
of points is simply the set of all convex combinations of the points in that set. Figs. 18 (c)
and (d) show examples of the convex hulls of two point sets.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 18: Convex hull concept (a) Convex point set (b) Non-convex point set (c) and (d)
Convex hull examples
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4.2.2.1.3. Voronoi Diagrams and Delaunay Triangulation:
Two related and very important CG concepts are Voronoi diagrams and Delaunay
triangulation. Starting with Voronoi diagrams, the problem is defined as follows (Miu,
2001): Given a set S of n distinct points pi ( pi  n , 1  i  n ) in a plane, find a set of
n cells, one per point (also called site) that divide the plane with the condition that a

point q is considered to lie in the cell associated with site pi iff the Euclidean distance
from that point to pi is less than the distance to any other site p j  S . An example of a
Voronoi diagram in shown in Fig. 19; please note that this diagram is a part of a bigger
diagram and therefore the boundaries are not descriptive of a typical boundary of a
Voronoi diagram. More clearly, a typical Voronoi diagram would have what is called
‘unbounded cells’ at the boundary; i.e. edges at the boundary would be extending to
infinity forming half planes. On the other hand, the cells that are closed are called
‘bounded cells’ and lie in the middle of the diagram. An edge in Voronoi’s diagram is a
subset of the locus of points that are equidistance from two sites pi and p j . Vertices are,
informally, the meeting points of these edges. The time complexity of finding a Voronoi
diagram for a set of n points in 2D is O(n 2 ) if brute force is used. On the other hand, a
complexity of O(n log n) can be achieved using Fortune’s algorithm (Fortune, 1986).

Delaunay triangulation is the dual of Voronoi diagram. The problem is defined as
triangulating a set of n points in a plane such that no point is in the circumcircle of any
other triangle (Sedgewick and Wayne (2007)). As Delaunay triangulation is the dual of a
Voronoi diagram for a set of points, Furtune’s algorithm can also be used to find
Delaunay’s triangulation. Therefore, the time complexity of Delaunay’s
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Figure 19: An example of Voronoi Diagram (generate using Quantum GIS©)

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 20: An example of: (a) Voronoi Diagram (b) Delaunay Triangulation (c) Voronoi
and Delaunay (generate using Quantum GIS©)

triangulation is O(n log n) as well. If brute force is used instead, the time complexity
becomes O(n 4 ) as stated by Sedgewick and Wayne. Fig. 20 (a) and (b) show examples of
Voronoi and Delaunay, and (c) shows both Voronoi and Delaunay for the same set of
points. It is also worth to mention that boundary of the Delaunay triangulation is the
convex hull.
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4.2.2.1.4. Centroid:
The centroid of a planar shape is the intersection of all straight lines that divide the
shape into two parts of equal moment about the line, Wikipedia (2011). It can be simply
thought of as the arithmetic mean of all points of the shape. There are many algorithms
used to obtain the centroid of a shape. One algorithm depends on the triangulation
discussed above as follows. First, a triangulation of the shape is done using the Delaunay
triangulation. Then, the centroids of the resulting triangles are found by taking the
average of the three vertices of each triangle. Finally, a sum of the triangles’ centroids
weighted by the corresponding triangles’ areas is found, and is normalized by the total
area of the shape11. This is only one example and is not necessarily the best available.
Fig. 21 shows some examples of shape centroids generated using Quantum GIS©.

Figure 21: Examples of polygon centroids

4.2.2.1.5. Douglas-Peucker’s Simplifier
Sometimes it is necessary to simplify a curve approximated by a set of points (also
called a poly-line) to get a new poly-line with a fewer number of points subject to a
11

Finding the centroid of a polygon, Subject 2.02, online: http://www.faqs.org/faqs/graphics/algorithmsfaq/
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certain tolerance. This is what a Douglas-Peucker’s algorithm does; Douglas and Peucker
(1973). Given a set of n points connected in a specific sequence to form a poly-line as
shown by the longer line in Fig. 22 (a), the objective is to find a subset of the points that
simplifies the given poly-line while not loosing the main features, i.e. within a certain
tolerance (describing the allowed distance to the original curve). The algorithm is
recursive and works by marking the start and end points to keep them and then finding
the point with the maximum perpendicular distance to the line connecting these two
points from among all other points. If that distance is greater than the tolerance, the point
is kept and two recursive calls to the algorithm are made passing the start point and the
newly kept point to the first call, and the newly kept point and the end point to the second
call. Otherwise, all other points that were not chosen to be kept yet can be discarded. At
the end, the kept points represent the new points. The shorter poly-line in Fig. 22 (b)
represents the simplified curve for a tolerance of 0.1. Fig. 8 (b) is an example of a

(a)

(b)

Figure 22: Examples of (a) A Douglas-Peucker-simplified poly-line.
(b) A simplified polygon.
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simplified polygon using Douglas-Peucker’s algorithm. The complexity of this algorithm
is  (n log n) and in the worst case: O(n 2 ) .
4.2.2.2. Deployment Algorithm:
The development of a deployment algorithm suitable for different transportation
networks and different scales is not trivial. This suggests the proposal of different
deployment schemes and making comparisons between them to arrive to the best possible
deployment. We propose two deployment algorithms for this purpose; each has its
rationale. It remains necessary, however, to study the cost and performance aspects
before the proposed deployments are actually implemented. We also believe that
separating the design of the deployment algorithm and the WSN packet routing protocol
is impractical. They should be designed simultaneously to guarantee the best results, as
the performance does not depend only on the deployment algorithm, but also on the
routing protocol. For this reason we kept in mind several routing factors while designing
the deployment protocols.
4.2.2.2.1. Method 1
In GIS, geographic data is represented as features that are usually stored in some
specific format. A feature could be a street, city border, river, police station, park, sensor,
etc. One very common format for storing GIS data is the so called shapefile (more
precisely: Esri12 shapefile). A shapefile stores geometric primitives, such as points, lines,
polygons, etc., that represent features. In both of our algorithms, the input is a shape file
containing GIS data about the different transportation links in the network under
12

http://www.esri.com/
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consideration. Links are usually stored as line-strings or multi-line-strings which are
simply groups of small line segments connecting points to form lines and poly-lines that
closely resemble curves. There are two output formats for both algorithms; the first is a
shapefile storing the deployments’ sensor locations as point coordinates (for display
purposes only), while the second provides deployment information in textual format. The
second output is the one intended for use by the deployment personnel. We selected
Chicago’s road network and Delaware’s road system as our test networks. Therefore, we
use them from here on.
The high-level description of the idea of the first algorithm is as follows: First, an
envelope that very closely encloses all network links is found. Then the skeleton of that
envelope is found. This will provide a descriptor for the overall shape of the network.
After that, we get all the terminal and junction points of the skeleton (as shown in Fig.23)
and find the combinations of all three points of this point set. For each combination a
triangle is formed. Then, for all the remaining terminal and junction points of the
skeleton, the distances to that formed triangle are found. The maximum distance is then
compared to a tolerance (a specific predefined length), and if the maximum distance is
shorter than that tolerance, the triangle is chosen to be used in the next step. Otherwise,
the combinations of all four points are found and the process repeats. If this fails again,
the next set polygons with an additional vertex are found, and the comparison takes place.
For the network under consideration, the process ended with a four vertex polygon as
shown in Fig. 24. The rationale for doing this step is to find the polygon with the smallest
number of vertices that can cover most of the network’s area. These vertices are used
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Figure 23: Skeleton with terminal and junction points defined

afterwards for placing the base stations (BSs). By selecting the locations of the base
stations at or near the corners of the network, deployment scalability is assisted. If a
neighboring city decides to deploy sensors as well, the BSs of the deployed WSN can
serve the adjacent parts of that city by using Omni-directional antennas instead of
directional antennas. This is shown in Fig. 25. The next step is to find the centroid of the
envelope; this will be the position of placing the central Command Center (CC)
responsible for collecting the data from the WSN and for issuing queries or notifying
emergency personnel. Placing the BSs at the corners and the CC at the center reduces the
data traffic congestion at the nodes surrounding the CC, prevents them from dying
quickly, and extends the network lifetime as a whole. Up till now, what has been done is
that the places of the BSs and the CC were determined. The next step is to find the
locations of sensors themselves. As the deterministic deployment in the case of a large
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scale deployment would be impractical due to the huge number of sensors used, our
approach is a mixture of deterministic and random deployment. More precisely, we can
say that it is almost random; the main component is that sensors are randomly deployed.
The smaller deterministic component is responsible for assuring that sensors have higher
concentrations as they get closer to the BSs and the CC and lower ones radially outwards
from their locations. This choice was made to help mitigate the quick node death problem
near the BSs and the CC (and the resulting hole problems) from a deployment
perspective. Because sensor nodes from all around the network collect and send data
towards the BSs and the CC based on closeness, the traffic near them is high most of the
time and energy depletion becomes fast. This causes these nodes to die faster than other

(a)

(b)

Figure 24: Finding the polygon with minimum number of vertices that covers most of the
network links. (a) A triangle is not sufficient. (b) A four vertex polygon is sufficient.
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Figure 25: Scalability of the BS deployment
nodes, leading to connectivity loss and the so-called ‘hole problem’ (A hole exists in the
network when a node finds no closer node to the BS than itself, and the same time, it
cannot transmit the packet directly due to long distance or power limitations). For this
purpose, we select a number of deployment radii exponentially increasing in value as
they move away from the BSs and the CC. The number of such radii is a design
parameter. On the other hand, the sensor density decreases exponentially moving away
from the BSs. Again, the parameters of this exponential function are design parameters.
Eqs. 40 and 41 are used to determine the deployment radii and the number of sensors per
inter-radius ring respectively. Eq. 42 determines the deployment start radius. Fig. 26
shows the generated radii and the resulting sensor distribution for Chicago’s network. In
addition, Fig. 27 shows a sample output containing the deployment information.

RiD  RsD  exp( F S i )

,0  i  NR

(40)

N i  C  exp( RiD / RmD )

(41)

RsD  0.5  R T

(42)
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Where:

F S : Deployment smoothness factor (smoothness of the sensor gradient)
RiD : Deployment radius i
RsD : Deployment start radius
N i : Number of sensors within radius i
RmD : Maximum deployment radius
C : Constant (was set to 1000 in the tests made)

R T : Base station / command center transmission range
N R : Number of deployment radii

(a)

(b)

Figure 26: Algorithm 1 (a) Deployment Radii (b) Sensor distribution
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Figure 27: Deployment method I: sample output

One detail not discussed yet is the determination of the tight envelope that closely
encloses the network links. First, points constituting the network links are extracted, i.e.
we deal with a point cloud in 2D. Next, Delaunay’s triangulation is used to triangulate
this set of points. If the resulting triangles are combined, we get the convex hull, but this
not what we need. Therefore, to overcome this problem, we do two tests on each triangle:
T
Test 1-1: AiT > const.  AMax
?

,1  i  M

Test 1-2: Does AiT contain any points from the point set?
Test 2: LTi < const.  LTMax ?

Where:

M

: Number of triangles

AiT

: Area of triangle i

,1  i  M
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T
AMax

: Maximum-area triangle

LTi

: Perimeter length of triangle i

LTMax

: Maximum- perimeter-length triangle

const. : Taken to be 0.4 (design parameter)
If the answer to the two parts of the first test is yes, the triangle is stored. If any of them
fails, test 2 takes place and the triangle is stored in the case of success. If none of the tests
succeeds, the triangle is discarded. Eventually, the stored triangles are combined to form
the envelope. This process is given by Algorithm 1-a shown in Table 2. The purpose of
the first test is to get rid of triangles with large areas that do not contain any points, i.e.
any links. The second test takes care of the triangles with small areas but with long edges.
These triangles are usually on the boundary and connect far points and should not be
kept. Two examples of triangle removal are given in Figs. 28 and 29. The left part of each
figure shows the original triangles and the envelope after triangle removal, while the right
shows the network as well.

Figure 28: Triangulation and removal of big triangles – Chicago’s roads
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Figure 29: Triangulation and removal of big triangles – Chicago’s railroad network

Table 2: Algorithm 1-a
Algorithm 1-a: (Triangle removal)
Input: Triangulation of the road network’s point set
Output: Envelope of the point set
find triangle with largest area;
find triangle with longest perimeter;
for each triangle of the triangles set
if Area(triangle) > const.  largest area
for each point  point set
if point  triangle
Store(triangle);
break;
else if PerimeterLength(triangle) < const.  longest perimeter
Store(triangle);
Combine(stored triangles);
Output(envelope);
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The above described technique for finding the envelope, although it achieves the
desired level of accuracy we want, it is not helpful when trying to find the skeleton. The
reason is that, as can be seen in the above figures, the number of points forming the
envelope can become large very quickly, especially if the network’s shape is not simple.
This causes the skeleton to have too many branches. As a result, the number of terminal
and junction points of the skeleton increases significantly. This leads to more
combinations to generate and more added complexity to the main problem. This
complexity is actually not required as the main reason for finding the skeleton is to place
the BS’s. Not being power constrained as the sensors, the BS’s can tolerate a slight
displacement from their optimal coverage position. Also, the deployment of the sensors
in a gradual manner radially outwards from the BS’s helps is mitigating any BS accessrelated issues (from the sensors’ perspective; as the BS will be powerful enough to send
messages to the CC as well as the adjacent BS’s). For these reasons a simplified envelope
would be sufficient to specify the locations of the BS’s. Thus, the previously generated

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 30: Envelope simplification: (a) Original envelope. (b) Douglas-Peucker
simplified envelope. (c) Comparison
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(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 31: A comparison between the generated BS locations (transparent polygon
corners): (a) Original envelope, skeleton, and BS locations. (b) Simplified polygon,
skeleton, and BS locations. (c) Comparison (coincident BS locations).

envelope is simplified using Douglas-Peucker’s algorithm as shown in Fig. 30. A
tolerance value of 0.05 LTMax was used. Again, this is a design parameter. Fig. 31 shows
the resulting BS locations and the difference in the complexity of the resulting skeletons
using the original and the simplified envelopes. In that figure we used Chicago’s railroad
network for the test. It is clear that the locations of the BSs are exactly the same for the
two cases. The reason is that the removed branches are the smaller ineffective ones in the
determination of the area that covers most of the network. Therefore, the simplification is
worth doing.
Although, we use the simplified envelope for getting the skeleton followed by the
locations of the BSs, the original non-simplified envelope is still of use. It is used to find
the centroid which is used for placing the CC, as this will be more accurate. Also, when
placing the sensors, it is better to use that envelope as it is a better enclosure of the
network links than the simplified version. Hence, we resort back to the original envelope
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when placing the sensors. Referring back to Fig. 26-b, one can see this in action. Now,
that all parts of the first method have been covered, the algorithm for Method I of sensor
deployment is provided below in Table 3 and the sub algorithms in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 3: Algorithm 1
Algorithm 1: (Sensor Deployment: Method I)
Input: Road network links’ shapefile
Output: Deployment radii, inter-radius sensor densities, locations
of the CC and BS’s, and a shapefile for display purposes
1

Extract(points forming the links);

2

Triangulate(extracted points);

3

use Algorithm 1-a to find point set’s envelope;

4

Store(envelope);

5

use Douglas-Peucker’s algorithm to simplify the envelope;

6

Skeleton(simplified envelope);

7

use Algorithm 1-b to find BS locations’ polygon; // vertices are the locations

8

Centroid(envelope);

9

for each BS

10

// CC location

use Algorithm 1-c to find sensor densities/locations around the BS;

11

use Algorithm 1-c to find sensor densities /locations around the CC;

12

Output(CC location);

13

Output(BSs’ locations);

14

Output(deployment radii and inter-radius sensor densities);

15

Display(sensor distribution);

// using the sensor locations’ shapfile

Table 4: Algorithm 1-b
Algorithm 1-b: (BSs’ locations)
Input: Simplified Envelope’s skeleton
Output: BS’s polygon
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1

find terminal and junction points of the skeleton;

2

threshold := const.;

3

combinationSize := 3;

4

do

5

// design parameter

for all combinations of size combinationSize

// in the point set just found

6

GenerateCombination();

7

CreatePolygon();

8

for each point in the terminal and junction point set

// using the generated combination

9

find distance to the created polygon;

10

Store(distance);

11

Sort(distances);

12

if maxDistance < threshold

13
14
15
16

Output(polygon);
return;
combinationSize += 1;
Forever;

Table 5: Algorithm 1-c
Algorithm 1-c: (Sensor locations)
Input: BS (or CC) location
Output: Sensor locations’ shapefile, deployment radii, and inter-radius
sensor densities
1

DeploymentSmoothnessFactor := const.

2

deploymentStartRadius := 0.5  transmissionRange;

3

for each BS/CC

4

GenerateRadii(deploymentSmoothesFactor);

5
for each BS/CC

7

for each ring

9

// # of radii = smoothness
// radii values are according to Eq. 39

6
8

// design parameter (e.g. =10)

GenerateRandomSensors();
Output(sensor locations to shapefile);

// # of rings = # of radii - 1
// # of sensors is according to Eq. 40
// for display purposes only

10 Output(deployment radii and inter-radius sensor densities);
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4.2.2.2.2. Method 2
In the previously discussed deployment method, a very important consideration was
neglected; link ranks. Not all the links have the same importance and criticality for both
the civilians and HS personnel, and as a result, to the attacker. Therefore, when protecting
the roads of a transportation network, it is necessary to account for this criticality and use
some means to address it. Important links should receive more attention. This means that
more monitoring and surveillance are required. From WSN’s perspective, this means
more sensors (for additional accuracy), the need for longer lives for sensors near the
important links, and higher data sensing rates. This can be simply translated as more
powerful nodes and a higher density near the important links. For this reason, an
enhancement has been made to the first algorithm to address this issue.
The solution to the above mentioned problem is achieved through the use of
electrostatic field theory. We believe that there is a great similarity between the problem
under consideration, sensor deployment, and the electric fields generated by a set of
charges at least in the transportation network scenario. In electrostatics, an electric charge
generates an electric field in its proximity and that field decreases as we move away from
the charge. As is well known, charges can be positive; having the field lines leaving the
charge, or negative; with field lines directed inwards towards the charge. Coulomb’s Law
states that a charge will always exert force on another charge, even when the charges are
separated by a large distance (Guru and Hiziroğlu, 1998). For a unit positive test charge
in space, the electric field at that charge due to a single point charge, using Coulomb’s
Law, is given by Eq. 43:
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E

1

Q
rˆ
4 0 r 2

(43)

Where:


E:

Electric field intensity

Q:

Charge magnitude (C)

r̂ :

Unit vector pointing from Q to the test point

0 :

Permittivity of the medium (8.85  10-12 Fm-1)

r:

Distance between Q and the test point

When there are n charges, the field at the test charge is the superposition of the fields
due to all point charges, and is given by equation 44. Fig. 32 shows an example of a set of
four positive point charges and their net electric field at the middle test point.
n 
n

1 Qi
E   Ei  
rˆ
2 i
i 1
i 1 4 0 ri

(44)

Figure 32: Effect of the electric field due to a set of point charges one a test point (the
middle back point)

94
We exploit this concept to account for the important links in the design of the
deployment algorithm. First, for the second algorithm to have a gradual deployment
around the BS’s and the CC as was the case in the other algorithm, a positive charge of a
certain magnitude is assigned to each BS and to the command center. In the testing stage
we used equal values of charge for all the BSs and for the CC. After that, the network
area is divided into small hexagonal cells that only cover the previously found envelope
(the original precise envelope in Method I, not the simplified one). These cells act as a
grid covering the whole network. In the next step, Coulomb’s Law is used to find the net
electric field due to these charges (using Eq. 44) at the center of each grid element, i.e.
the center of each hexagon. The final step includes mapping the resulting field value at
each element to a number of sensors to be deployed randomly within that element. The
above steps will result the desired gradual deployment. Fig. 33 shows the difference
between the two techniques.

(a)

(b)

Figure 33: Difference between the deployment gradient in (a) Method I and (b)
Method II
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Although Fig. 33-b might seem less appealing, the used technique is actually better than
the one used in Fig. 33-a. The reason is that as the grid-cell size becomes smaller and
smaller, the gradient becomes smoother. More precisely, having small enough (relative to
the average link length in network under consideration) grid cells, makes the differences
in the numbers of generated sensors moving from one cell to the other very slight. For
example, in the above figure, the grid element size used is comparable to the length of the
link being protected. This makes the deployment shown in Fig. 33-b unsuitable for this
granularity. However, if the grid-cell size is much less than the link length, the transition
from the area very close to the BS outwards becomes unnoticeable. Fig. 34 shows the
gradient of the deployment for grid-cell side lengths of 3000, 2000, 1000, and 600 from
left to right.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 34: Deployment gradients for grid-cells’ side length of (a) 3000, (b) 2000, (c)
1000, and (c) 600.

The algorithm then uses the same above technique to protect important links. The
difference is that in the case of transportation network links, we have line segments
describing them instead of just points or locations as was the case with BS’s and the CC.
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Figure 35: Charges assigned to a link’s junction and end points, and the resulting
effect on a grid cell’s center point.

To overcome this problem without computationally complicating the problem, charges of
the same magnitude are assigned to each junction point connecting any two line segments
in the set of line segments that form the roads. Otherwise, we would have had to consider
line charges and do integrals over the lines, which may result numeric overflows,
memory run-outs, and other dramatic increases in the computational complexity. An
example link along with the associated charges is shown in Fig. 35. The figure also
shows the effect of these charges on a test point; a grid cell’s center. After assigning
charges to transportation links, the problem is treated similarly to what was done before;
the field value is found at the center of every grid cell and sensors are placed accordingly.
An illustration of the resulting deployment is shown in figure 36. The only remaining
question is how to consider the ranks? The answer to this question is to give each link in
the highly ranked links, chosen to be ten in this work, a charge value proportional to that
rank. By doing this, the rank-1 link will have the highest charge value and consequently
the highest associated field. Rank-2 link will have the second highest field, and so on.
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Figure 36: Illustration of Method II of sensor deployment

This will cause the deployment gradients to depend on the rank, and therefore, the highly
ranked links will have higher concentrations of sensors near them, while the other low
rank ones or the ones that have not been ranked will get lower densities of sensors. For
the links that have not been ranked, the sensor density will be governed by the charges of
the BS’s, the CC, and other close links that has been ranked. Fig. 37 shows an example of
this deployment technique as applied to Chicago’s road network, and Fig. 38 shows a
sample deployment info output.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 37: Deployed sensors on Chicago’s road network using deployment method II:
(a) Links on top; (b) Sensors on top; (c) Elements highlighted.
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Figure 38: Deployment method II: sample output

Now, that the basics needed for understanding how the second method works were
covered, we move forward to the details of the algorithm. The second deployment
method has the same main preparation steps as the previous one, i.e. steps 1-8 in
algorithm 1. The only difference is in the step associated with the placement of sensors.
Therefore, we can summarize the second method as follows: 1) first, the envelopes, both
the precise and the simplified, of the network are found ‘steps 1-5 in algorithm 1’, 2) the
skeleton of the simplified envelope is then found ‘step 6’, 3) BSs’ and CC’s locations are
found using algorithm 1-b ‘steps 7-8’, 4) a hexagons grid covering the precise envelope is
then generated using a pre-specified hexagon side length, 5) charges are assigned to BS
and CC locations, 6) charge values, to be assigned to the links proportionally to their
ranks, are calculated based on the number of ranks considered. 7) the charges are then
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assigned to the link points, 8) the field due to the set of all point charges; BS’s, CC, and
links’ point charges, is found at each grid cell, 8) the field value at each grid cell is then
mapped to a number of sensors that are randomly deployed in this cell with a uniform
distribution. Table 6 lists Algorithm 2.

Table 6: Algorithm 2
Algorithm 2: (Sensor Deployment: Method II)
Input: Road network links’ shape file
Output: Sensor deployment locations shape file, grid cells’ center locations,
and sensor densities
1

hexagonSideLength := const.

// Design parameter based on the average length of

2

// a network link

3

ccCharge := const.

// Design parameter; the charge assigned to the CC

4

bsCharge := const.

// Design parameter; the charge assigned to each of the BSs

5

Extract(points forming the links);

6

Triangulate(extracted points);

7

use Algorithm 1-a to find point set’s envelope;

8

Store(envelope);

9

use Douglas-Peucker’s algorithm to simplify the envelope;

10 Skeleton(simplified envelope);
11 use Algorithm 1-b to find BS locations’ polygon;
12

Centroid(envelope);

// CC location

13

CreateGrid(envelope, hexSideLength);

14

// create a hexagonal grid covering
// the envelope

15

AssignBSCharges(bsCharge) ;

16

AssignCCCharge(ccCharge) ;

17

for each rank

18

CalculateChargeValue();

19

Store(charge value);

// the first 10 most important links
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20
21
22
23
24

for each link
for each point on the link
assign the corresponding charge value based on link’s rank;
for each grid cell
for each point charge that is stored

// stored point charges include the CC’s point

25

// charge, BSs’ point charges, and the point

26

// charges of all highly ranked links

27

compute the electric field at the center of the grid cell;

28

map the field value at that cell to a number of sensors;

29

// the integer floor of the
// value of the field was used

30

generate that locations randomly;

31

Store(sensor locations);

// uniformly distributed

32

Output(CC location);

33

Output(BSs’ polygon);

34

Output(grid cells’ center locations and sensor densities);

// corners are the BS locations

4.3. Simulation Environment and Implementation
In this section, the implementations of the attacker-defender model both in VenSim
and in Java are discussed. Followed by that is the Java implementation of the sensor
deployment algorithms and an associated tool designed to serve as an assistive tool to HS
personnel in getting the information needed for the actual deployment.
4.3.1. Simulating Attacker-Defender Interaction
As discussed previously, system dynamics is very well suited for modeling complex
systems. There are several system dynamics’ model development and analysis software
environments available such as DYNAMO, IThink/Stella, PowerSim, VenSim, and
others1. Ventana Systems Inc. provides a free personal learning edition of VenSim called

1

http://www.vensim.com/sdmail/sdsoft.html

102
VenSim PLE. This and other commercial versions provide a very good GUI that
facilitates the design and analysis process. VinSim PLE was found sufficient for the
purpose of this work. The attacker-defender model was first designed and analyzed in
VinSim, and then it was implemented in Java to have full integrity with the other tools
being developed. Actually, VenSim provides interfaces for integration with other
software, but we preferred the above approach to guarantee full control. Next, we provide
the details associated with the implementation of the model in both environments.
4.3.1.1. VenSim Simulation
In VenSim, models can be easily constructed graphically through the insertion of
different model variables on a desktop like pane. After the variables are inserted,
connections can be made, and the equations associated with each variable can be input as
functions of other variables, from a spread sheet file, or by other means. One good thing
about VenSim is that the model will not work until all variables’ units are consistent. We
believe this a one way of validating a model as the designer will be checking model
correctness during the design process through two steps; the correct modeling of each
variable and the verification of this correctness by the proper units connecting this
variable to the models of other related variables. VenSim also provides some useful
analysis tools that ease the analysis of the designed model as will be seen in the
discussion below.
The first sub-model, the HS perception model, was implemented in VenSim as
shown in Fig. 39. Each of the variables shown in figure has an underlying equation as
described in section 4.2.1.2. VenSim allows the designer to enter the equation through the
equation editor by double clicking the variable in the equation mode. For example, the
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equation for the HS-S probability of attack success appearing in the equation editor is
shown in Fig. 40.

Figure 39: HS Perception Model Implementation in VenSim

Figure 40: Specifying the equation for the HS-S probability of attack success
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Figure 41: Causes Tree of the HS-S probability of attack success

Figure 42: Uses Tree of the HS-S probability of attack success

Using the so called ‘causes tree’ enables us to show the model variables that ‘caused’
the variable under consideration or, in other words, that led to the change in the value of
that variable. As the probability of attack success from the HS agency’s point of view is
the main output in the first sub-model, we study it more closely. Fig. 41 shows the causes
tree for that variable. As can be seen, it is a direct function of the HS-S uncertainties, the
number of protected and unprotected links, and the protected link obfuscation function. It
is also an indirect function of the variables on the second level of the tree (leftmost group
of variables).
In addition, a ‘uses tree’ shows the uses of the variable under consideration by other
variables. The uses tree of the HS-S probability of attack success is shown in Fig. 42. The
tree shows that the rate of link protection is a function of the HS-S probability of attack
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success. Similarly, the number of additional links that could be protected is a function of
the rate of link protection.
The HS perception model is connected to the other two sub-models through the
variables discussed in section 4.2.1.2. This can be seen through the trimmed right side of
Fig. 39. The attacker perception model and the real world model are shown in Figs. 43
and 44 respectively. It should be clear how the three sub-models interact as variables
included in each sub-model affect, in either a direct or an indirect way, the variables in
the other two sub-models. As in the HS perception model, the trimmings on the sides of
Figs. 43 and 44 are due to the connectivity to the other sub-models.

Figure 43: Attacker Perception Model implementation in VenSim
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Figure 44: RW Model implementation in VenSim

4.3.1.2. Java Implementation
In addition to the implementation in VenSim, the attacker-defender interaction model
was implemented in Java. The purpose of re-implementing it in Java is to have greater
flexibility and to support the integration of all developed tools. The implementation
followed the system dynamics’ sequence of operations. This sequence is illustrated in the
flow chart given in Fig. 45. Java, being an object oriented language, is very suitable for
the purpose of that model. Each entity involved in the interaction was represented by a
class, and instances were drawn. For example, the homeland security agency, attacker,
real-world, and interaction classes were created. This is really helpful as it allows for the
extensibility of the model. If, in the future, it is needed to model different attacker types,
the collaboration of different HS agencies, or parallel interactions, it would be easy to
instantiate different objects of these classes as necessary. The UML diagram of the model
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Figure 45: A mapping of System Dynamics’ sequence of operations to the Java
implementation

is shown in Fig. 46. Please note that not all the variables and methods are shown due to
space constraints.
In this implementation, the HS agency, the attacker, and the real world have their
associated properties representing their respective sub-model variables. The interaction
has its own properties which represent the interaction variables. The program works as
follows: An interaction tester class creates instances of the interaction, HS agency,
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attacker, and real world classes. The tester then associates each of the three participating
entities to one another, and associates them to the interaction. It then runs the interaction
and the results are output. A sample output is shown in Fig. 47.

Figure 46: HS-attacker model UML diagram
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Figure 47: Sample output of the Java implementation of the HS-attacker interaction
model

4.3.2. Sensor Deployment Tool – Java Implementation
A tool, with a graphical user interface (GUI), for deploying sensors using the two
proposed algorithms was developed. Its aim is to assist HS personnel in generating
deployment locations and densities for the considered cities easily. The tool makes use of
GIS data to generate the deployment according to some coordinate system and overlays it
on the map of the city under consideration. We call this tool the Deployment Realization
Tool (DRT).
The tool was implemented in Java and made use of existing open sources libraries
such as GeoTools1 (GeoTools The Open Source Java GIS Toolkit) – for GIS date

1

GeoTools The Open Source Java GIS Toolkit - http://geotools.org/
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Figure 48: GUI of the Deployment Realization Tool (DRT)

handling and processing, JTS1 (Java Topology Suite) – for some computational geometry
functions, and the Skeletonizer plug-in2 – to obtain the skeleton of the road network’s
envelope. Several other classes were created manually. The tool is still under
development and is subject to further enhancements. In this section, we present this tool,
an overview its current capabilities, and brief the additions that are planned for future
work.
The GUI of the tool is shown in Fig. 48. It has a desktop layout that contains four
frames; ‘Structure’, ‘Properties’, ‘Content’, and ‘Output’. The structure frame is used
currently only for showing the layers used in the project, this is done through the ‘Layers’
tab. In the future, it will have other tabs for showing the file hierarchy in the project and
for navigating through system files to open layers. The properties window has two tabs.
1

Java Topology Suite - http://www.vividsolutions.com/Jts/JTSHome.htm
Plugins for OpenJUMP - http://sourceforge.net/apps/mediawiki/jumppilot/index.php?title=Plugins_for_OpenJUMP
2
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 49: DRT’s Toolbar Icons (a) Read Network (b) Place CC & BSs (c) Place
Sensors: M1 (d) Place Sensors: M2

The first is called ‘Deployment’ and the other is ‘Network’. In the deployment tab, a
table lists the generated numbers of the CC, BS’s, and sensors. The network tab shows
the number of links in the network. These tabs will be extended to have more deployment
and network parameters. The content frame shows the network being processed. It can
have more than one network simultaneously in different tabs. Finally, the output frame is
used to give some hints on how to use the tool when it is launched and to list the output
deployment’s information such as: the number of deployment radii, sensor densities,
locations of grid cell centers, and the number of command centers and base stations.
There are four icons in the toolbar: ‘Read Network’, ‘Place Command Center & Base
Stations’, ‘Place Sensors: First Method’, and ‘Place Sensors: Second Method’. These
icons are shown in Fig. 49.
The user first reads the road network for which it is desired to generate the
deployment. The input is a shape file containing the network links (roads). This is done
by clicking on the ‘Read Network’ icon as shown in Fig. 48. The GUI then displays the
network and adds it as a layer in the ‘Layers’ tab of the ‘Structure’ window on the top
left. This is given in Fig. 50.
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Figure 50: The read network and the associated layer in the ‘Layers’ Tab.
The next step is to deploy the Command Center and the Base Stations. This is done
by clicking the “Place CC and BS’s” icon. The tool then starts executing the common
part of the two algorithms. At the end of this stage, the tool will add the network’s
simplified envelope, the centroid (CC location), the skeleton, and the BSs’ polygon as
new layers in the ‘Layers’ tab and display them on the network as shown in Fig. 51.
The user can next choose one of two options: sensor deployment Method 1 or 2.
Suppose the user selected Method 1, the tool then executes Algorithm 1 and displays the
output as shown in Fig. 52. The outputs for this and all other steps are stored in output
shapefiles. This is done for each layer. The output window also displays the deployment
details, including the number of BS’s, CC’s, the deployment radii, and sensor densities.
When the user chooses the second deployment method, Algorithm II is executed and
the output is displayed as shown in Fig. 53. In that case, the output window also displays
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the locations of grid cell centers, and sensor densities in additions to the number of CC’s
and BS’s.

(a)

(b)
Figure 51: (a) Placing the CC and the BSs. (b) The result showing the skeleton, the
simplified envelope, the centroid, and the BS polygon
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(a)

(b)
Figure 52: (a) Placing sensors using Method I. (b) The result showing the deployed
sensors along with the deployment radii.
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(a)

(b)
Figure 53: (a) Placing sensors using Method II. (a) The result, showing the deployed
sensors. Notice that the highly ranked links receive higher sensor densities in the case.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

To test, analyze, and demonstrate the abilities of the proposed models and algorithms,
this chapter provides two test cases for both the attacker-defender interaction model and
the deployment algorithms. Sensitivity analyses are conducted and conclusions are drawn
for each case. The attacker-defender tests are done first followed by the deployment
algorithms tests.
5.1. Attacker-Defender Interaction
5.1.1. Test Case 1: Varying Defender’s Uncertainty
In this first test case, we study the effect of lack of information on the HS agency’s
side on the three probabilities of attack success, on the rate of link protection, and on the
number of unprotected links. For this purpose we fix all other model variables and
change only the variable ”HS-S Uncertainties”. This variable takes the values from 0.005
to 1. The reason for the selection of 0.005 as the lower bound on uncertainty is that if it is
made equal to zero the probability of attack success will be zero, which is unrealistic.
Also, making it equal to zero means that the HS agency has complete information, which
is a very rare case. On the other hand the upper bound is set to one to indicate that if there
is a very high uncertainty about some aspects, the probability of attack success will be
governed completely, form the HS point of view, by what the other contributors to that
probability impose.
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Table 7: Values used for the variables in test case 1

Uncertainty values used in case study 1
Value 0.005 0.204 0.403 0.602 0.801 1

Table 8: Uncertainty values used for sensitivity analysis

Table 7 lists the values used for the model parameters in this case, and the variable we
change the value for. The values used for the U HS  S are shown in table 8. We use an
increment of 0.199 starting at 0.005 and ending at 1.
When the uncertainties of the HS agency increase from 0.005 to 1, it is noticed that
the probability of attack success from its perspective (Fig. 54) increases in value, and the
time range this higher probability is spanning decreases. After some year specified by the
uncertainties value, the probability decreases with a faster rate as the uncertainties
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Figure 54: HS-S probability of attack success

Figure 55: Rate of link protection

increase. On the other hand, decreasing the HS uncertainties causes the probability to
decrease in value and to be spread over the ten year period with approximately the same
probability per year. The danger alert is fired after one year from the start time as the time
to plan and commit attack becomes smaller than the time needed to discover attack
planning and cease attack. This happens when the knowledge needed to overcome
protection is exceeded. The firing of this alert causes a change in the rate of link
protection (Fig. 55) to be triggered. As can be seen from table 7, the HS tolerable
increase in link protection rate is two links per year. For this value, and depending on the
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current value of the probability of attack success, the increase in the rate of link
protection is determined. The higher the uncertainties are, the higher the increase in link
protection rate, and the higher the increase in link protection rate is, the faster that the
unprotected links need to be protected by the HS agency to overcome this lack of
certainty and high probability of attack success. This indicates the importance of
intelligence in the protection-attack evolution process. An appropriate level of
intelligence information collection should be kept along with the deployment of
technology to reduce the required budget and to keep the network safer at the same time.
The required level of intelligence can be inferred from the required level of certainty that
needs to be kept.
It is also important to notice that the faster the rate of link protection becomes, the
closer in time that rate decreases, rapidly as well, because of the resulting effect from
protecting more links; which is more safety and less ACT probability of attack success
(because of the increased number of protected links), and less A-S probability of attack
success (due to the perception of the attacker that more links are getting protected).
Taking a closer look at the number of unprotected links over time is important as this
provides the HS agency with the roadmap that it can follow to deploy the technology.
Starting with the average number of damaged links over a period of time (taken here to
be 3 years), it is noticed that sometimes, even when it exceeds the maximum allowable
number of damaged links by the HS agency, there could be no protection adjustment i.e.
no additional links would be protected. The reason for this is that protection adjustment is
an indirect function of the probability of attack success from the HS agency’s point of
view as well. So, when this probability is reasonably low the adjustment is a fraction of a
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Figure 56: Number of unprotected links

link which won’t be considered (practically irrelevant). Therefore, as shown in Fig. 56,
even when the uncertainties are very high, the curve with the x’s, the number of
unprotected links doesn’t encounter a sudden decrease. Instead, it is noticed that there is
one link that becomes protected at year four then from year four to year five, there are no
additional links that become protected, and finally, from year five to year eight there is a
constant rate of decrease in the number of unprotected links of value 3 links/year. The
reason for this behavior is that at year four the average number of damaged links exceeds
the maximum allowable number of damaged links, and in addition, the number of
additional links that could be protected had reached a non-fractional value that caused
one link to get protected. After that, what happens form year four to year five is that this
average drops again below that maximum allowable value, therefore no adjustment is
done. Starting from year five, the average goes above the maximum allowable value
again, and this time there is a sufficient amount of links that can be protected. This is
because the continuation of having a high value for the probability of attack success from
the HS’s perspective led to the increase in the desired rate of link protection (and the
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Figure 57: Actual probability of attack success

desire to spend more budget for this purpose. This desire is of course controlled by the
tolerable increase in the protection rate).
It can be concluded form the above analysis that it is not necessary to deploy
technology all at once. The deployment can be spread over a considerable period of time.
This would provide budget relief, the opportunity to deploy new technology
advancements, and finally, the chance that circumstances may change and the attacker
may get caught.
The ACT probability of attack success is affected by many factors. These factors are:
the number of protected and unprotected links, the actual time to discover attack planning
and cease attack (this time increases exponentially over a long period of time in this
model to account for opposing conditions that may actually act against the HS agency’s
well), the actual minimum time to plan and commit attack, and other factors (these other
factors represent factors that can be added in the future to refine the model. In the current
model these factors are represented as a constant equal to 0.1. The complement ’0.9’ of
this constant is multiplied by the remaining factors that affect the actual probability). An
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analysis of the simulations results shows that, as shown in Fig. 57, the ACT probability of
attack success initially increases from 0.125 to 0.18 during the first year due to two
things; the rapid decrease in the ACT time to plan and commit attack, and the slow
increase in the ACT time to discover attack planning and cease attack. After one year, the
rate of increase of this probability decreases the ACT time to plan and commit attack
reaches its minimum possible limit while the ACT rate of discovering attack planning
and ceasing attack keeps its slow rate of increase. Starting from year 3, the probability
drops with a rate depending on the number of links that get protected which in turn
depends on the HS-S probability of attack success in an indirect way.
The analysis of the A-S probability of attack success follows the same direction as the
analysis of the ACT probability of attack success. However, there are three differences:
First, the A-P number of unprotected links is affected by the protected link obfuscation
function which deceives the attacker. Second, the A-P time to discover attack planning
and cease attack is also affected by a deception factor that causes time to seem longer to
the attacker. Finally, the A-S time to plan and commit attack has a different rate of
decrease than the one that affected the ACT probability of attack success. These
differences collectively cause the A-S probability of attack success follow the pattern
shown in figure 58.
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Figure 58: Attacker seen probability of attack success

Table 9: Values used for the variables in test case 2

HS-S knowledge effect values used in case study 2
Value 1.5e − 007 1.16253e − 007 6.75083e − 008

Table 10: HS-S knowledge effect values used for sensitivity analysis

5.1.2. Test Case 2: Varying the Defender-Seen Knowledge Factor
The effect of knowledge on time from HS’s perspective is addressed in the second
test case. Table 9 lists the variables that have different values from the previous case. The
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variable “HS-S Effect of Knowledge on Time” is varied as shown in table 10. Simulation
results show that a small change in this variable has an obvious effect on the three
probabilities of attack success in the three sub-models. Starting with the first value, 1.5e007, of the HS-S effect of knowledge on time (the curve with Δ’s in Fig. 59), the HS-S
probability of attack success decreases over time starting three years after the simulation
start time due to the chosen values for other variables. When the HS-S effect of
knowledge on time is decreased, the probability decreases at approximately the same rate
it had, but sooner in time. For the values shown in Table 10, the probability decreases
starting at year two and one, respectively. For the probability of attack success from the
attacker’s perspective (Fig. 60), the general trend of this probability over time is a
reduction in its value. The decrease in the effect on knowledge variable causes this
decrease to start earlier in time as in the previous case. It is noticed however that there is
some non-uniformity in the effect on this probability during first two years. This is,
however, not caused by the variable under consideration. It is otherwise due to the effect

Figure 59: HS-S probability of attack success (test case 2)
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Figure 60: A-S probability of attack success (test case 2)

of the link obfuscation function. The actual probability of attack success (Fig. 61) has the
decreasing trend over time like the previous ones but, in general, it has overall smaller
values than the other two due to the fact that real world factors that affect this probability
may be different from what the two opponents perceive. The effect of decreasing the HSS effect of knowledge on time on this probability is very similar to its effect on the other
two; namely, it makes the decrease start time occur sooner. Again, in the first year it is
noticed that this probability increases over time and that no matter what the value of the

Figure 61: Actual probability of attack success (test case 2)
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Figure 62: Number of unprotected links (test case 2)

HS-S effect of knowledge on time is the probability is the same. The reason for that is
that the number of unprotected links (Fig. 62) is the same during the first year for any
value of the effect of knowledge on time and is fixed i.e. doesn’t decrease. The above
analysis shows that the perception of the HS agency could alone make an observable
influence on the actual and the attacker seen probability of attack success. This happens
as a result of the decisions made based on that perception that get translated into real
world actions (protection deployment) that then affect other system variables. This shows
the importance of having a very good perception on the HS’s side; this can be supported
by very well managed intelligence processes.
5.2. Sensor Deployment
In this section, the Deployment Realization Tool (DRT) is tested on two networks. A
sensitivity analysis is conducted on the smoothness factor while fixing the number of
deployment radii in the case of the first deployment algorithm. For the second algorithm,
the sensitivity analysis is done on charge values and the grid element side length. The
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goal is to analyze the resulting deployments and draw some conclusions. The two
networks are: the State of Delaware's routes system1 and Chicago’s major streets2.
5.2.1. Test Case 1: Delaware's Road System
First, we apply deployment method I on the shape file of Delaware’s road system. The
file contains 70 links representing the main roads. The generated number of BS’s for this
network is 4 and there is only 1 command center as expected (as we always place the CC
at the centroid of the network). These numbers remain fixed for all the tests done on
Delaware’s network.
The sensitivity analysis is conducted by varying the value of the deployment
smoothness factor F S and keeping the number of deployment radii fixed at some
specific value. Four tests were carried out for this purpose. Table 11 shows the used
values of the design parameters. We list the equations again for convenience. The
original equations can be found in section 4.2.2.2.1. Fig. 63 shows the deployment radii
for each of the tests and Fig. 64 gives the generated sensors. The different values of the
smoothness factor are listed in Table 12.

N i  C  exp( RiD / RmD ) ; RsD  0.5  R T ; RiD  RsD  exp( F S i ) , 0  i  F S
Parameter

RT

RsD

C

NR

Value

2000

1000

1000

10

Table 11: Values of the design parameters for the first sensitivity test

1
2

The shapefile can be found at - http://www.deldot.gov/information/pubs_forms/gis/centerline/index.shtml
Visit this site for the shapefile - http://data.cityofchicago.org/browse?tags=gis
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 63: Deployment radii for F S equals: (a) 0.4 (b) 0.7 (c) 1.0 and (d) 1.3

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 64: Generated sensors for F S equals: (a) 0.4 (b) 0.7 (c) 1.0 and (d) 1.3
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Run

FS

# of sensors

1

0.4

44190

2

0.7

48930

3

1.0

50904

4

1.3

51936

Table 12: Smoothness factor values and the corresponding generated number of sensors

It is easy to see from the above sensitivity tests that to have a smoother deployment, it
is better to have a larger number of deployment radii, while having a smaller deployment
smoothness factor. This is can be more specifically seen in Fig. 63-a and 64-a. To see this
idea more clearly, we fix F S at 0.4 and increase the number of deployment radii
gradually as shown in Fig. 65 and table 13.

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 65: Generated sensors for F S = 0.4 and N R equals (a) 10 (c) 15 and (d) 30
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Run

NR

# of sensors

1

10

44190

2

15

73884

3

20

103830

4

25

133800

5

30

163770

Table 13: Number of deployment radii and the corresponding generated
number of sensors

From the above analysis, is it concluded that a balance between the number of
deployment radii and the value of the smoothness factor (which collectively control the
actual deployment’s difficulty) is necessary to achieve the desired deployment
smoothness and consequently reduce traffic congestion near the BS’s proportionally. This
is an optimization process where the objective is to minimize the number of sensors while
maintaining a reasonable smoothness. This problem will be considered in future work.
5.2.2. Test Case 2: Chicago’s Major Streets
Chicago’s road network was used to test and analyze the sensitivity of the second
algorithm to the variation in the charge values and the number of grid elements.
Chicago’s major streets file that was used contains 359 links. First, the sensitivity of the
deployment to the magnitudes of the charges assigned to the BS’s, CC, and the links will
be studied. This test will be divided into two sections: changing BSs’ and CC’s charges
while fixing those of the highly ranked links, then the reverse. In these two sections, the
grid element side length will be fixed to 600. Table 14 shows the values of the charges
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allocated to the links based on rank. These values are calculated using a base charge as
given in Eq. 45. Table 15 lists the values used for the BSs’ and CC’s charges and the
corresponding total generated number of sensors. Finally, the resulting deployments are
shown in Fig. 66.
Qi  Qb  ( N ranks  i )

(45)

Where:
Qb

: Base charge

Qi

: Charge per point of link i

N ranks : Number of ranks (= 10 in this work)
i

: Rank

Link Rank

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Charge

1.0E-

9.0E-

8.0E-

7.0E-

6.0E-

5.0E-

4.0E-

3.0E-

2.0E-

1.0E-

(per point)

05

06

06

06

06

06

06

06

06

06

Table 14: Link ranks and the associated charges

BS/CC Charge
# of Sensors

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

39501 80534 125265 171671

Table 15: BS/CC charges and numbers of generated sensors
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 66: Generated sensors for BS/CC charges equal to a) 0.05 b) 0.1 c) 0.15 d) 0.2.
Note that the ranks were generated randomly and therefore may differ from run to run.
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The above tests show that the number of sensors increases linearly with the increase
in the charge value. Also, it is clear from Fig. 66-a that for very low charge values, the
field can be very weak that it would fail to have any effect on some grid elements, and
consequently there will be deployment gaps in the network. This especially happens
when the network has some sharp edges that are far from the locations of other BS’s or
the CC. Therefore, it is necessary to choose an appropriate charge value for the BS’s and
the CC to assure that their fields intersects. Again, this is an optimization problem as it is
required to find the minimum charge that guarantees a gapless deployment. This is due to
the fact that the accumulated charge values are mapped to numbers of sensors, i.e. it is
required to minimize the number of sensors while keeping a continuous deployment.
In the second section of this test, the base charge value is changed and consequently
the links’ assigned charges will change. The effect of this change is given in Fig. 67 for a
fixed BS’s and CC charges of 0.1, and the values of the base charge and the generated
sensor numbers are shown in Table 16.
The above test shows that a very little increase in the per-link charge values may lead
to a significant increase in the number of sensors. This is expected to greatly affect the
overall system cost. Therefore, a careful choice of the value of the base charge is
necessary. However, as can be seen in Fig. 67-d, as the values of the charges assigned to
the links increase the deployment’s nature changes to be more like a regional-importancebased deployment. This means that regions of the city close to highly important links get
higher numbers of nodes due to the high field value at these regions. Hence this can be
useful if the target is to have regional-importance-based deployment.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 67: Generated sensors for base charge equal to (a) 1.0E-08 (b) 1.0E-07 (c) 1.0E-06
(d) 1.0E-07.
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Base Charge 1.0E-08 1.0E-07 1.0E-06 1.0E-05
# of Sensors

77230

77870

80534

169671

Table 16: Base charge values and numbers of generated sensors

Finally, we end our sensitivity analysis with the grid cell’s (hexagon) side length
change test. Its effect on the resulting deployment and the number of sensors is studied.
For that purpose, we fix both the links’ base charge at 1.0E-06 and the BS/CCs’ charges
at 0.1, and only vary the grid element’s side length. Similar to the above analyses, the
values of the grid elements’ side length values are provided in Table 17 along with the
resulting number of sensors, and the deployments are shown in Fig. 68.

GE’s Side Length 3000 2000
# of Sensors

1000

500

2736 9008 29772 211294

Table 17: Grid element’s side length values and numbers of generated sensors

The deployment figures indicate that as the side length of the grid cell decreases, the
accuracy of the deployment increases, as expected. This is because the number of grid
cells increases, the field is evaluated at more and more points (grid cell centers), and the
more these points are the more accurate the calculated densities of the sensors placed in
each cell. One can think of this as if the cell is approaching a zero size; if that happens,
the field value would be found at every point in the network’s area.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 68: Generated sensors for grid element side length equal to (a) 3000 (b) 2000 (c)
1000 (d) 500.
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There are two concerns, however, about increasing the number of grid cells: First, the
computational complexity becomes high very fast, and the second is that the number of
generated sensors increases nearly exponentially. This leads us to the same result that we
got previously: This is an optimization problem, where it is required to find the optimal
number of grid cells that achieve the highest deployment accuracy within a budget
constraint, for example.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

6.1. Summary
In this work, one modeling and two algorithmic contributions were proposed along
with two homeland security assistive tools. The first contribution is a model which
describes the interaction between an attacker and a homeland security agency and
prescribes a plan of actions for the HS agency. The second is the proposal of two WSN
deployment algorithms. Regarding the tools, the first tool is intended to serve as a
decision support tool for technology deployment plans. It takes measurable input values
of different variables extracted from intelligence information and produces a set of
assistive charts that guide the deployment plans. The produced charts provide the HS
agency with indicators about how far the collected intelligence information may be from
the reality, the vulnerability of the network, and the time frame over which the agency
can deploy technology while maintaining an acceptable level of safety. This tool was
implemented both in Java and in VenSim, but it does not have a GUI currently. The
second tool is a sensor deployment tool, which has been implemented in Java and has a
ready to use GUI. It accepts a GIS-data ‘shapefile’ that contains the roads of the network
under consideration. The tool enables a user to select from two sensor deployment
strategies and produces the corresponding deployments in the form of shapefiles
containing node distributions and a textual output that contains the information needed
for the actual deployment.
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The two tools were tested on several inputs and a sensitivity analysis has been done
for some test cases. The results of the first tool indicate that technology deployment need
not be carried out all at once for the network under consideration while being able to
maintain a desired safety level decided by the HS agency. It was also shown that the
probability of attack success from the perspectives of the attacker and the HS agency may
differ significantly from one another and from the actual probability, and that the
perception of the HS agency alone can have a significant impact on the results of the
interaction. As for the second tool, it was shown that the second deployment method is
better than the first. This is because it takes link ranks into consideration, and is expected
to distribute the concentrated effect of high traffic near the BSs, which will highly likely
form big holes around the BSs, over the whole network with a very small granularity that
in turn weakens that effect. The ability of this tool was also tested through the generation
of the two deployments for two networks changing different design parameters for each
and testing the results.
6.2. Usefulness of the Results
The usefulness of the proposed attacker-defender interaction model and the
accompanying tool will depends mainly on the availability of intelligence data. Great
effort was exerted to ensure that the variables used in the model represent measurable
quantities that are accessible to intelligence agencies. We believe that coordination
between information collecting agencies can serve this goal greatly. Once the inputs to
that model are available, its use is straightforward.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the model produces a set of supportive graphs that
represent the probabilities of attack success from different perspectives and a technology
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deployment time plan represented in the rate of link protection graph. It is believed that
the availability of such set of outputs significantly serves the process of assessing the
vulnerability of the system, analyzing the risk of being attacked, and allocating the
monetary expenses needed for system protection.
All the outputs are given in a per-year form. This should be helpful in studying the
contributions of different system factors to the possibility of having a successful attack at
a specific year, for example. It also gives the overall trend of that probability which is
useful to make future predictions. The availability of three probabilities of attack success,
two of them describing the perceptions of the two opponents and the third representing
the ‘almost’ actual probability, is useful for the HS agency in determining its need for
track corrections and strategy change decisions. At the end, the model is a selfassessment and decision support tool that is expected to help HS agencies to make better
decisions.
In the design of the deployment approaches presented in this work, two
considerations were given attention; addressing WSNs’ design issues and producing an
easy to use deployment tool that gives an easy to use output. The first proposed algorithm
produces a set of deployment radii/contours and an accompanying set of sensor densities
for each inter-radius ring. The second produces a set of hexagonal grid cells’ center
locations, cell side length, and the density of sensors per cell. These outputs are sufficient
to describe the respective deployments completely as the deployment of individual
sensors is random. The sample outputs presented throughout the work show that using the
generated outputs can provide smooth deployments that address different WSN related
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issues. Also, the use of GIS data gives a realistic view of how the deployment will be and
the obstacles that may be encountered in the physical deployment.
In conclusion, it is thought that the outputs of the proposed models and approaches
are expected to be useful for the purposes of self assessment, decision support,
deployment planning and decisions, and in the actual deployment.
6.3. Practicability of the Results
The practicability of the HS-attacker model and tool is not a concern as they provide
graphical and numerical outputs used for assessment and decision support. The major
concern would be with the deployment approaches provided. A natural question that may
be asked is: Are these deployment approaches realistic and practicable? The answer to
this question has two partitions, one related to the feasibility of the approaches and the
other is policy and public acceptance related. Starting with the first, the sensor numbers
generated in the simulations (bearing in mind the large scale of the deployment) show
that an appropriate choice of the design parameters can produce very reasonable numbers
of sensors from a practical viewpoint. In Addition, the outputs, represented in the
deployment radii and the grid cell hexagons can be easily used through the traditional
surveying techniques.
The other concern is public acceptance of these deployments and the associated
policies. It is clear that the proposed approaches provide a deployment that requires a
city-wide coverage. Spreading these large amounts of sensors over the whole city
necessitates that sensors should be deployed within the boundaries of numerous private
properties. This is expected to be considered by many as a privacy violation issue. Even
though the goal is to provide public safety, different perceptions of the existence of such
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devices in the surroundings will definitely be diverse. Whether policies that mandate the
placement of these devices should be created or not is another issue. Therefore, careful
studies of the possible solutions to this concern are required.
6.4. Conclusions
Many conclusions can be drawn from the proposed models and approaches. In the
context of the interaction between homeland security agencies and attackers, it has been
concluded that the difference in perceptions due to the different views of each opponent
of the real world and the other, can lead to significantly different perceptions of the
probability of a successful attack. Another important conclusion is that the perception of
the HS agency has its important effect on the interaction. Therefore, HS agencies should
work hard to reduce the uncertainties of their knowledge about the attacker. Additionally,
what represents a chance to the attacker should be investigated deeply, as these chances
are a basic hidden player in the interaction. Finally, it was found that the technology
deployment process can be spread over some time period while maintaining the safety
level desired by the HS agency.
Deployment-wise, it has been concluded that networks with sharp corners can cause
deployment gaps if insufficient charge values were used at the base stations and the
command center. Also, the grid cell elements, used to find the resulting field at different
network points, were found to produce better results as their size decreases. This happens
as the decreased size allows for field evaluation at more points and consequently
produces more accurate sensor densities at different locations.
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6.5. Future Work
Several areas of enhancement exist for the current work. Regarding the attackerdefender model, it is intended to discover methods for model validation and sub-model
refinement. It is also very important to explore methods for modeling “attacker chances”.
Chances play a very important role in the model; they participate in the attacker’s
decision process of whether or not to attack. When a chance exceeds a pre-specified
threshold, it becomes active. In the current model, chances were generated randomly with
a uniform distribution. However, finding the correct distribution by taking into
consideration the readiness of the attacker at the time of the chance, the history
information of the attacker (which decides the suitability of the chance and its correlation
to other chances), and the state of the targeted link (protected/unprotected), is necessary
for correct chance modeling.
Other very important aspects to develop include: the consideration of different
attacker types, different target system elements, and the non attack alternative on the
attacker’s side.
Improvements will be done to the sensor deployment algorithms by optimizing the
number of sensors while avoiding deployment gaps and maximizing the data traffic flow.
Trials will be made to restrict the deployment to network links only taking into
consideration the congestion issue. Additionally, a data routing protocol will be
developed, according the specification mentioned in Chapter 2, and tested on the
proposed deployments for end-to-end delay, delivery ratio, etc.
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Finally, more features will be added to the already existing tools, such as WSN
routing support, and development will continue for the uncompleted ones.
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